THE UNKNOWN TRADITION: CONTINUITY AND INNOVATION IN SOVIET ETHNOGRAPHY

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Note on the System of Transliteration: In this paper we use the Library of Congress system to transliterate Russian words and titles. Two exceptions were made: in the text, but not in the references, the -skiĭ surname ending was changed to -sky if the author has published in English, or is known by the English form of the name, and the I in the combinations, Îa- and Îu-, which transliterate single Russian letters, is changed to Y (i.e., Yuri rather than Îuriĭ, Yakov rather than Îakov).

WHAT IS "SOVIET ETHNOGRAPHY"?

Historically, the central concerns of Soviet ethnographers have been the notion of primitive society, its evolution, and social theory in general. Soviet writings on these topics are the main subject of our analysis. We also touch, more briefly, on the recent Soviet interest in ethnicity, its roots in traditional Russian ethnography and its connection with the concept of culture. Since social sciences bear the imprint of the society in which they exist, the tenor of its spiritual life, we approach our task within the framework of general Russian and Soviet intellectual history. Since the theory of inevitable and universal social evolution from preclass to postclass communal society was at the very foundation of official Soviet ideology, much ethnography was invested with great ideological significance. This close link to the political and ideological monism of the Soviet system largely determined the character of theoretical discussion. Abstract theoretical debate was inspired by practical considerations of political expediency, or, minimally, the content was *interpreted* as ideologically correct or harmful.

This and some other featues of Soviet ethnography would not be immediately obvious to an outsider. They do not lie on the surface. Therefore, a historical perspective is essential for understanding contemporary ethnography in the USSR.

When asked, Soviet social scientists would unanimously claim they are Marxists. Since Soviet citizens must toe the official line, especially when dealing with the outside world, sceptics in the West might doubt their sincerity. Some will also point out the "double think" and "double talk" of Soviet and East European intellectuals so vividly described by the Soviet emigré writer and philosopher A. Zinoviev, and the Polish Nobel Prize emigré poet Cz. Milosz [1].

And yet, the Soviet scholars' claim would be to a considerable degree valid. First of all, classical Marxism – in its official interpretation – is the only philosophy the majority of Soviet scholars are intimately familiar with. Even among the sophisticated intelligentsia, very few people, in our opinion, would be inclined to question its philosophical foundations. For its part, the regime has made sure that non-Marxist ideas within the country

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are known only through critical reviews of professional ideologues, some with scientific degrees. Even the scientists have come to take it for granted that their access to the literature published in the West is limited and ultimately controlled by the state. This, however, does not prevent many scholars from being well read in their areas of professional interest.

But even though the *intent* of Soviet social scientists to stay within the Marxist tradition cannot be doubted, it is the *results* of their work on which we have to make our judgements. In our opinion, it would be woefully incomplete or even misleading to define Soviet ethnography as simply "Marxist."

First, classical Marxism does not include anthropology and ethnography as major components. Many hypotheses advanced in Frederick Engels' classic work, *The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State*, for a long time held sacred in the Soviet Union, were finally rejected. Outside the USSR presently several competing schools of thought exist, each claiming to be Marxist. Furthermore, obvious political and ideological constraints within the USSR ensure that scientific "dissent," or revision of orthodox views, is always dressed in the protective garb of a return to the true meaning of Marxism. What seems to the untrained Westerner just another tedious scholastic discussion often hides a very serious theoretical dispute [2]. It may even have elements of psychological drama, since in the Soviet Union ideas are taken very seriously and the losing side may pay a heavy price for its defeat.

But, again, it is not claims of allegiance to true Marxism (which is essentially the unavoidable basic *language* of theoretical discourse in the USSR), but results that are important. Anthropologists have long been familiar with the difference between ideal and real culture, as well as the distinction between the emic and etic, borrowed from linguistics.

The second reason the definition of Soviet ethnography as Marxist is unsatisfactory is that (as our Soviet colleagues would readily admit), much new data has accumulated since Marx and Engels and entire new fields of research have opened up.

Most creative Soviet scholars seem tired of airy philosophical abstractions, of endless injections of ideology, and of ritualistic use of oft-quoted passages from Marx, Engels and Lenin characteristic of their discipline for so long. They are interested in securing and, where possible, increasing their relatively new, if limited, freedom of discussion and ability to present their views without fear. This is incompatible with the use of old ideological labels. But ideological constraints still exist, and many people remember that accusations of "non-Marxist," or "revisionist," not to mention those verbal monstrosities, "creeping empiricist," "bourgeois formalist" and "Menshevizing idealist," could be quite lethal.

Despite a certain relaxation of ideological control over social sciences in the USSR after Stalin's death, there has remained a powerful group best described as fundamentalists, the members of which occupy high academic and administrative positions in the social sciences. Considering themselves guardians of the true doctrine, their primary concern is the ideological "purity" of Soviet science. These people, trusted by the Party, may also be held responsible for any heresy or un-Soviet behavior within their areas of authority. Since members of this group usually represent Soviet science abroad, their viewpoints alone are perceived as the whole of Soviet ethnography. The selection of people and papers to represent Soviet views abroad is centrally controlled, and authorization of foreign travel for Soviet scholars is, of course, not determined by the Academy of Sciences. There are scholars, quite influential within the Soviet scientific community, who will never be allowed to travel abroad.

The Institute of Ethnography of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the main center of ethnographic research, has branches in both

Moscow and Leningrad. The Moscow branch has more people in high administrative positions, and is closer to the centers of power. There also exists an element of competition characteristic of the historical Moscow-Leningrad rivalry. A similar situation exists in linguistics, archaeology, history and oriental studies. The ethnographers chosen to represent Soviet science abroad are practically all from Moscow. To go abroad, Leningraders frequently must join the Moscow establishment and move to Moscow.

For a long time Western anthropologists virtually ignored their Soviet counterparts. Few Soviet publications appeared in Western languages, and most Westerners do not read Russian. The situation did not change fundamentally when Marxism acquired credibility in the West. One exception is Stephen P. Dunn, a long-time observer of Soviet ethnography. He and his wife, Ethel Dunn, have published a collection of Soviet works with a perceptive introduction [3], and have started a journal of translations, *Soviet Anthropology and Archaeology*. The Dunns have provided the Western reader of Soviet ethnography with a number of valuable insights into the Soviet conceptual world and style of writing. They note continuity in the Russian ethnographic tradition going back to the nineteenth century. The Dunns point out that [4]:

> Soviet scholarship works with a group of agreed upon concepts embodied in a set of texts more or less known to everyone. It is our feeling that this state of affairs offers definite advantages as long as the canonical texts are not rigidly or capriciously interpreted.

This explains why Soviet communication between social science disciplines (ethnography, archaeology, history, sociology, social psychology) is much easier than in the West: the body of canonical texts and concern with the theory of social evolution provide them with a common ground.

In England, Soviet works were enthusiastically "discovered" by Ernest Gellner of the London School of Economics. Quoting mainly from the historian Danilova's paper published in 1968, which represented the most sweeping and far-reaching reaction to date against the fundamentalist position (see below), Gellner declared Soviet Marxism to be "short-haired, not long-haired." He noted, however, that the sequel to the volume in which Danilova's paper was published never appeared [5].

But, it is an exaggeration to present Soviet ethnography as unorthodox and Soviet Marxism as "short-haired." Both the long uninterrupted Russian ethnographic tradition, and the particular Russian-Soviet perception of Marxism have been powerful forces shaping modern Soviet ethnography.

Gellner and his assistant, Tamara Dragadze, were successful in generating enough interest to arrange a meeting between Soviet and Western scholars sponsored by the Wenner-Gren Foundation in 1976, the result being a joint publication [6].

In his contribution, Gellner chose to analyze the views of Yuri Semënov, whom he calls "a highly distinguished theoretician of Marxist and Soviet anthropology." A prolific writer on such diverse topics as the origins of humankind, the theory of socioeconomic formations, and economic anthropology, Semënov is widely regarded among his Soviet colleagues as a creator of grand schemes and evolutionary sequences in the spirit of speculative philosophy of history and largely irrelevant to their practical tasks [7]. He is not generally regarded as an ethnographer by practicing scientists, but as a social philosopher engaged in the renovation of orthodoxy. Meyer Fortes, who seemed to be genuinely impressed by his meeting with the Soviet delegation in 1976, remarked politely that [8]:

> Semënov's exposition of his Marxist frame of analysis was at a level of generality or abstraction that made discussion difficult...

Severe, even ferocious criticism of Semënov's selective use of ethnographic survivals by Vladimir Kabo [9] represents a more typical reaction by ethnographers, archaeologists and non-fundamentalist philosophers in the USSR. However, since Semënov is recognized by the ethnographic establishment and Soviet officialdom as an extremely skillful, if not always traditional, exponent of doctrine, he will continue to represent Soviet ethnography at the international level.

A somewhat similar position was occupied by the late "grand dame" of Soviet ethnography, Yulia Petrova-Averkieva, the editor-in-chief of the journal *Sovetskaîa Etnografiîa* (Soviet Ethnography). Soviet colleagues in private acknowledged that her theoretical positions remained frozen at the level of the late 1940s. She believed in a universal stage of matrilineal society that preceded patrilineal, in the promiscuous human herd as the initial stage of social evolution, and she quoted the "classics of Marxism-Leninism" (a Soviet idiom) in her works ad infinitum. In essence, her role in the journal was that of ideological watchdog, protector of the faith (even Semënov's unorthodox defense of orthodoxy did not always please her). One of her specialties was criticism of American anthropology, which, as a doctoral student of Boas, she knew well (see below). The contrast between her familiarity with American anthropology and her antiquated theoretical background was particularly stark.

Social scientists in the USSR sometimes are asked to write critical essays about Western theories. Some do it with enthusiasm, and even make a career out of it; others resent it. But the harsh and uncompromising tone of anti-Western rhetoric seems to be on its way out, and most serious scholars try to abstain from roundly accusing their Western colleagues of being "bourgeois," "anti-Marxist," or ignorant of the Marxist approach.

This modest de-ideologization of theory after the Stalinist era is linked with the greater freedom scholars enjoy today. They understand that discussion conducted in more ideological terms could ultimately imperil their own position.

A first-time Western reader of Soviet works is usually struck by some peculiarities of their language. Characteristically, there is a division into "our" (Soviet) and "their" (Western) science, even when the author agrees with a particular position of a Western scholar. This is not merely a matter of style; it is the legacy of a profound sense of cultural (and ideological) difference, and isolation. Various ideas considered cornerstones of the Soviet or Marxist position are often presented in an aggressive and uncompromising manner. These properties are somewhat subdued, however if a paper is written for a Western audience.

Again, Petrova-Averkieva is a case in point. In her contribution to the 1980 joint collection of essays edited by Gellner, her topic was the application of principles of historicism in Soviet ethnography. The claim to historicism, an approach to social phenomena which places them in both a general evolutionary sequence and in the context of their particular development, is a major Soviet theme. Petrova-Averkieva has very little to say about ethnohistory (or ethnogenesis) or the ethno-historical study of folklore. Instead, after some philosophical generalities (a legacy of the Stalinist style), and quotes from Marx, Engels, Lenin (and Semënov) [10], she simply reaffirms an old fundamentalist scheme of social evolution that has been increasingly under attack in the Soviet Union since the 1960s [11]:

> Most of *our* scholars adhere to the division of this (primitive) formation into three major historical epochs: the primitive human herd, the matrilineal clan, and the transition to class society.

This calls for several comments. First, it is obvious that the above sequence is logically incoherent since it is not built on a consistent principle. The matrilineal clan is merely one

of several ways in which kingroups may be organized; it is not on the same categorical level as class society, which encompasses all politically-organized (state) social systems, with the possible exception of transitional forms. The primitive herd is a traditional, largely tacit rather than theoretical, fundamentalist concept dating back to the nineteenth century. It is built on negative principles, – lack of recognition of kinship ties, lack of established marriage rules (promiscuity), lack of "divisions of labor," lack of "production relations," etc. – making it a sort of "black box" notion. The whole scheme goes back to the late 1930s and 1940s when it became standardized orthodoxy. Averkieva virtually repeats Sergei P. Tolstov's version of 1946 [12].

Another striking feature for Western readers is the effort expended on spurious speculations about the fine points of such conjectural notions as promiscuity or the primitive herd. The explanation for this lies, as we shall show, in the character of incorporation of Marxism in the Soviet Union, and the "freezing" of social theory under Stalin.

Did the stifling of theoretical discussion in the 1930s and the subsequent emergence of fundamentalism render Soviet ethnographic theory devoid of interest except as a "lesson" in ideological rigidity, or, as a piece of Soviet intellectual history? Quite the reverse: the coming into being of the fundamentalist dogma is informative, not to mention the struggle against it, which lately has registered substantial achievements.

We will use three major perspectives as the basis for a typology of interpretations of Soviet ethnography:

1. The role of the Russian intellectual – and ethnographic – tradition dating back to pre-Soviet times.
2. The incorporation of Marxism as the basic social theory underlying all social sciences.
3. The interaction with western social and cultural anthropology.

It is necessary to keep all these perspectives in mind despite the standard Soviet claim that their social theory is based strictly on Marxism.

THE INTELLECTUAL TRADITION

The pre-revolutionary Russian intelligentsia was a group formed out of various social classes and held together by ideas, not by a shared profession or economic status. In any case, the economic position of most of them was substantially lower than in the West. The intelligentsia was a peculiarly Russian phenomenon, without a close parallel in the West. As Nikolai Berdyaev has noted [13]:

> The intelligentsia was always carried away by some idea or other, for the most part by social ideas, and devoted itself to them supremely. It acquired the power of living by ideas alone. Owing to the Russian political conditions, the intelligentsia found itself divorced from practical social work, and that easily led to social day-dreaming. In the Russia of aristocracy and serfdom the most socialist and anarchist ideas were developed.

Social theories borrowed from the West invariably acquired a very radical character, and were taken in the most absolute, uncompromising, dogmatic fashion [14]. This situation reflected the impossibility of action, and, ultimately, the lack of middle ground between the regime and the emerging revolutionary movement. Both the government and the lower classes tended to be suspicious of the intelligentsia. Dogmatism and the religious fervor with which social ideas (and ideals) were approached appear to have been components of a protective strategy in a hostile environment.

The lack of a politically experienced middle class mediating between the political extremes, stemming from the impossibility of meaningful political work under an outdated and increasingly inept government,

made theory in politics, philosophy and sociology all-pervasive (a phenomenon Berdyaev aptly called "limitless social day-dreaming"). A line of Russian thinkers, from Belinsky to Mikhailovsky and Bogdanov, represents the characteristically Russian search for an integral theory that would answer all the fundamental questions of being, unite theoretical and practical reason, and provide a philosophical foundation for the ideal of social justice.

The quest for wholeness was to be found in both atheist (Belinsky, Herzen, Chrenyshevsky, Bakunin) and religious (Fedorov, Solovëv) settings. A large part of the Russian intelligentsia abandoned religion, partly under the influence of the French Enlightenment, and later French socialism, but mostly because the Orthodox Church in Russia had become discredited and had lost its moral authority. The difficulty of reconciling oneself to the idea of God in the face of corruption and daily suffering was intensified by the weakening of church authority in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when doctrinal indecision made the church intellectually irrelevant. Formal religion became incompatible with sympathy for humankind [15]. Dostoevsky's writings illuminate this way of thinking. Again, the *ethical* element in the intelligentsia's search for a theory of social justice was paramount. The ideas of revolution, atheism, and socialism merged with the notion of a millenial triumph of good over evil (Herzen and Belinsky exemplify this merger).

Our claim that historicism is a major theme of Soviet ethnography has roots in the intellectuals' sense of historic mission. It expresses, perhaps, the aspiration of the intelligentsia to be a social group of "outsiders" substituting themselves politically for both the dominant and exploited economic classes on the basis of transcendant knowledge of the "process of history," entitling them to direct the construction of the just social order [16]. This "process of history" became an essential myth of the educated Russian, validating his or her perceived role as mediator in the birth of a morally superior social order. The philosophy of evolutionism gave form to the mystical faith in "history."

The widespread interest of educated Russians in history and their attraction to evolutionary ideas, therefore, tended to go hand-in-hand (even now the terms "evolution" and "history" are often used synonymously). The appeal of evolutionism lay in its universalist and determinist aspects, whereby outmoded social forms inevitably would be replaced. The assumption that novel forms would be superior gave this appeal a moral tone.

Conversely, Social Darwinism was seen as mirroring the moves of capitalist society, and gained little support in Russia. The feeling that Darwinian natural selection is somehow immoral seems to persist in high places. For instance, in a current version of the fundamentalist viewpoint, the emergence of human beings is inseparable from the suppression of "zoological individualism." This rationalizes doctrine, according to which, in the course of human evolution, biological laws are superceded by "laws of society" through hierarchical subordination of "the biological to the social level of the organization of matter" [17].

The evolutionary *Weltanschauung* of late nineteenth century Russian intellectuals was not limited to the empiricists and materialists. It was shared by some committed to idealism and mysticism. They tended to reduce evolutionism mainly to a moral imperative for "progress." A Soviet historian of the peasant commune controversy recently noted [18]:

> In Russia, it was not only historians committed to the positivism of Comte and Spencer, who were receptive to the idea of evolutionism. In conjunction with deeply held beliefs in the heuristic cogency of historical science and in progress as a law of history, even the best representatives of patently idealist historiography were so inclined.

The concept of social evolution espoused by Russian utopian revolutionaries of the "Pre-Reform Era" (that is, prior to liberation of the serfs in 1861), gave way to the doctrine of universal and inevitable "progress" identified with the philosophical "evolutionism" of August Comte and Herbert Spencer which became fashionable among a segment of the Russian intelligentsia during the three decades of reaction (1865–1897).

Irrational faith in the millenarian victory of good over evil, rationalized through acceptance of the positivist doctrine of progress, seems to have fulfilled ideologically the same need for an antidote to frustration and impotence that terrorism fulfilled in practice. For many intellectuals the passionate belief that the hour of triumph of a just social order, the end of history, was at hand, was simply an inversion of chiliastic religious feelings: the most extreme expression of which was the Nihilists' spurious dialectic. Proclaiming that good comes of evil, terrorists acted out this dialectic with bombs and bullets.

The connection between feelings of political impotence and faith in predestined progress was recognized by the more perceptive Russian intellectuals of the day. For instance, Nikolai Chernyshevsky derided the positivist notion of general progress as worthy only of children, seeing its popularity as a sign of widespread despair [19].

It may be that a sense of this connection was one of the reasons the various trends of evolutionary thinking (including at first Marxism, which came to Russia disguised as economic evolutionism) met with much less opposition from defenders of orthodoxy and the social order than Darwinian theory met in England, the United States and France. The combination of passivity with inevitable "progress," the moral message of which was directed *against* Social Darwinism, undoubtedly attracted many social conservatives to evolutionism. Again, the institutional subservience of the Russian Orthodox Church to the Tsar showed that religious authorities had no independent position on civil doctrinal matters.

Utopian beliefs that certain traits in the Russian character or social relations would enable Russian development to avoid the evils of capitalism were common among intellectuals of this period. By the time Marxist ideas reached Russia, their ground was well prepared. To Marx's surprise, the first radicals to adopt his theories were Russians. Russian intellectuals saw Marxism as a radical social philosophy, more complex, rigorous, and unified than any previous Western theory. Marxism to them was both a doctrine of historical materialism, and a doctrine of deliverance. It is significant, that while one part of Russian Marxists valued above all the integral deterministic world outlook coupled with extreme materialism, another group eventually moved to an idealist, and later on, religious current of thought (S. Bulgakov, N. Berdyaev).

The deterministic, evolutionary, messianic, chiliastic, and ethical elements were central to the understanding of Marxism in Russia: the proletariat is "good," the bourgeoisie is "evil," the communist revolution, inevitable; Russia will lead the world into the future.

THE ETHNOGRAPHIC TRADITION: THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Continuity between theoretical projects and research concerns of pre-revolutionary Russian and Ukrainian ethnographers and those of contemporary Soviet scientists is explicitly recognized. For instance, Yulian Bromley, director of the Institute of Ethnography of the USSR Academy of Sciences, wrote in his introduction to a recent "state of the art" anthology of translated articles by Soviet ethnographers and physical anthropologists [20]:

> Many ethnographical traditions which were carried on in Soviet times, originated in fact in the pre-revolutionary period.

Ethnography was a well-established discipline in pre-revolutionary Russia even though no Russian university had a Department of Ethnography until after the Revolution (see below). Despite this lack of institutional recognition, a great amount of ethnographic research was conducted prior to the Revolution, resulting in an impressive body of literature [21]. Towards the end of the last century, A.N. Pypin, the well-known and highly respected Russian intellectual historian and biographer of N. Chernyshevsky (to whom he was related), undertook a four volume history of Russian ethnographic thinking [22].

In recent years, Soviet ethnographers have come to value their rich heritage. Pre-revolutionary ethnography is better studied in the USSR than sociology, another social science well developed prior to 1917 [23]. Publications include articles in *Soviet Ethnography*, the principal journal [24], a series of occasional papers, *Essays in the History of Russian Ethnography, Folklore Studies and Anthropology*, and even a general history by a leading ethnographer of the first Soviet generation, Sergei Tokarev [25]. Almost any work on the peasantry of Russia, the Ukraine or Belorussia makes extensive use of research carried out prior to 1917, and includes a high proportion of references to works published in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Indeed, it would be safe to say that largely because of research undertaken in the last century, the Russian peasantry is today by far the best described in the world (see below).

This fact highlights a major difference between Russian-Soviet ethnography and its counterpart in the USA and England. Unlike the latter, *etnografía* was never confined to study of exotic foreigners and "primitives," and therefore, was never defined as a contrast between "us and them" [26]. The general disinclination to oppose one's own people to the people under study is one reason that sociology in Tsarist Russia did not arise in opposition to ethnography (indeed, Maxim Kovalevsky, in Europe and America known as a founder of Russian sociology, is regarded in the Soviet Union as a leading pre-revolutionary ethnographer).

Thus ethnography never had the status of a colonial science, either in Tsarist Russia or in the USSR. Likewise, *Volkskunde* was not separated and opposed to *Völkerkunde* in the manner of German and Scandinavian ethnography.

This lack of strong contrast reflected, as Yu. Bromley observed [27], "the status of the bulk of the Russian people (peasantry) differed little from that of the people living on the fringes of the empire." The Dunns add [28]:

> Most of the early Russian ethnographers encountered the primitive peoples with whom they were concerned on a more nearly equal footing than did their Western counterparts.

In this regard, the efforts made by the great Russian ethnographer, Nikolay Miklukho-Maklay (1846–88: his father, who died when he was a child, was a Scottish adventurer), to meet the people of New Guinea on an "equal footing" contrasts vividly the initial encounters between native and scientist characteristic of English, Dutch and German ethnographers in Oceania and Australia. Miklukho-Maklay's attempt to establish "equal relations based on respect for each others' humanity and customs" (paraphrasing Miklukho-Maklay) was linked to his later vehement advocacy of independence for the natives of the Maklay Coast. His refusal to publish his research, in order to prevent its use by the English, German and Australian colonial administrations, both embarassed the tsarist authorities and helped to explain why Miklukho-Maklay became a model for young Soviet citizens and "patron saint" of Soviet ethnography in the years immediately following the Revolution [29].

It is probably true that the reformers and radicals of the 1850 to 1890 period contributed more to the emergence of characteristics that link Russian to Soviet ethnography than did any other segment of the Russian and Ukrainian intelligentsia. They especially influenced the development of ethnographic theory and the ethic of commitment, which favored an interventionist approach that saw neutrality in the name of "objectivity" as basically immoral. For instance, Miklukho-Maklay wrote [30] that one is justified to engage in scientific endeavor only as a form of "the struggle to reconstruct society according to just principles."

This connection was not merely ideological. The principal founders of Soviet ethnography, Lev Shternberg (1862–1927) and Vladimir Bogoraz (1865–1936), began their careers in ethnography as exiles in eastern and northeastern Siberia due to their participation in the revolutionary terrorist organization, "Peoples' Will" (*Narodnaîa Volîa*) [31].

The relationship between currents of reform and revolution and the development of Russian/Soviet ethnography is deeply rooted. Historically, it can be traced to the emergence of the intelligentsia as a distinct stratum in the wake of the defeat of Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812, and the subsequent triumphal entry of Imperial Russia on the European stage as the interceding power, brought to life by Alexander I in his Holy Alliance of monarchs (1815). Officers of the "Army of Victories," for the most part educated sons of the landed gentry, brought from France not only impressions of a free citizenry, but corresponding "Western" ideas.

On the other hand, it was universally recognized that the true victor of the Patriotic War of 1812 had not been any leader, or even the army as an organized force, but the Russian people, land and climate. They had triumphed over rationality and scientific organization. Russian nationalism emerged as a mystical cult of unbounded devotion to Country and Divine Truth (inseparable devices) inspiring the People to superhuman endurance in the face of "Evil." The cult was expressed in and through the Tsar, "the living icon of God" [32]. Hence, Europeans discovered "the Russian soul."

Recognition of a Russian national identity, therefore, was linked to conceptualization of a Russian "spirit" sustained in the mass of the population, which had escaped the Enlightenment introduced into Russia by Peter the Great. Living according to the old customs (*po staromu bytu*), this supposedly immobile mass surrounded the small "cultured" ("civilized") sector brought into existence by Peter's reforms. Overwhelmingly peasant, they represented a time before civilization, *pervobytnost'*, when people lived in tune with their feelings, through which the law of God was manifest. Order in the world was heavenly, not the rational order of civilization, but an *ikonostasis* on which the prescribed hierarchical order (*chin*) of representations of true being (*obrazy*) was emblazoned, "the external expression of the transfigured state (*preobrazhenie*) of man" [33].

This description of Russian characteristics was conveyed by the term, *narodnost'*. In the reign of Nicholas I (1825–55), a mystical interpretation of *narodnost'* was invested with the authority of the state religion. Rationality was transcended in the "Holy Trinity" of "Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality" (*pravoslavie, samoderzhavie, narodnost'*) through the implied equation of tsarist hierarchy to the heavenly order. From 1848 to 1855, no other interpretation was allowed. Even the Slavophiles (*slavîanofili*), intensely patriotic, were placed under open police surveillance.

In fact, it was the Slavophiles' conservatism that brought them into conflict with the apparatus of power. Looking into the past for the meaning of the present, they discovered in the Russian peasantry a significance that transcended Western civilization. With them the opposition of Old Russia to New resulted

in the elevation of nationality above church and state as "the spirit of the people." With that the mission of the Russian people ceased to coincide with Imperial destiny [34].

The term *narodnost'* exactly translated *Volkstum*: a population sharing an identity. In his mystical trinity cited earlier, the inventor of the term, Count Sergei Uvarov, Nicholas I's Minister of Education and President of the Imperial Academy of Sciences, had in mind an identity with the other two terms [35]. Seeking a suprarational basis for truth and authority in the ancient East, Count Uvarov looked to mythology and occult writings ("metaphysical archaeology") for the sources of this identity [36].

Indirectly at least, Uvarov encouraged the study of folklore to discover the sources or principles (*nachalo*) of *narodnost'* in the legends, folktales, beliefs, and other examples of popular wisdom. Thus, as a specialized branch of knowledge, ethnography came into being in Russia on a foundation similar to that in Germany and Scandinavia, linked conceptually more with German romantic idealism than to French rationalism. As Billington notes [37], virtually all the important social theorists of the early and mid-nineteenth century, Westernizers (*zapadniki*) as well as Slavophiles, "had philological or ethnographical interests."

Many of the well-known Slavophiles collected folktales, songs, beliefs, etc., while several made substantial contributions to Russian folkore studies, including Vladimir Dal' (1801–72), Pavel Yakushkin (1820–72) and Petr Kireevskii (1808–56). In contrast, only one of the Westernizers was a major figure in Russian folklore studies: Alexandr Afanas'ev (1826–71). The ethnographic interests of the Westernizers tended to develop in another direction: under the influence of Hegel and the French utopian socialists – above all, Saint-Simon and stimulated by the investigations of the Russian peasant commune by the Prussian, Baron August von Haxthausen [38], they turned to the study of contemporary peasant life and institutions.

This proved to be a significant event in Russian intellectual history. Again, it was prepared by the Slavophiles, who in their search for the roots of the "spirit of the people," had switched their attention from heaven to earth, where they found a source in the land itself, the so-called "territorial source" (*zemskoe nachalo*). Everyday life in Russia imbued this "source," conceived in the tenor of German romanticism, with a reality absent from *Volkstum*. Unlike his West European counterpart, the Russian investigator of folklore encountered the "primitive era" (*pervobytnoe vremîa*, lit., "the time of primordial customs") all about him, not in the distant past.

It is not surprising, therefore, that when the Slavophiles constituted an ideal identity preserving some "memory of the race," they idealized those who continued to live in the ancient ways – the peasant masses. The older Slavophiles, like Aleksei Khomiakov and Konstantin Aksakov, idealized the peasant patriarchal extended family household. However, by the 1840s they were beginning to identify the source of the popular spirit with the Russian peasant commune, *obshchina*, about which the Slavophile, Yuri Samarin (who in 1861 was to draft the Imperial Edict liberating the serfs), wrote "the answer to the most urgent problem of the west (i.e., socialism) lies in the oldest customs of the Slavs" [39].

The peasant question was the supreme social issue in the nineteenth century. In connection with this problem, intellectuals began to think about society in general, reforms, social justice and evolution.

Thus, from the very beginning, the study of social evolution was linked to the problem of the fate of the Russian peasant commune. Since this was no idle question, but one fraught with great meaning for the individuals concerned, it had implications for practical

life. As the result of the frustrated efforts of successive generations of young intellectuals to effect change in the social order, belief in social evolution became a moral mission; first invested in the *muzhik* and later, in the proletariat, the final anchors of salvation in a sea of universal chaos. It was as if the messianic mission of the Pan-Slavic Third Rome, betrayed by Autocracy and Orthodoxy during the Crimean War (1854–55), was resurrected in the world commune, one aspect of a religious mindset turned inside out [40].

The peasant commune began to be considered seriously as the foundation for carrying out the renovation of social institutions as the hope for political renovation was abandoned. This required an understanding of the commune's function. The Slavophiles had tended merely to idealize the commune as "an organic religious community" [41]; Haxthausen had shown, however, that its foundation was economic – periodic redistribution of land held in common according to a principle of equal access to land by member households. This stimulated research to determine the structure and operation of agricultural communes in the Caucasus, the Ukraine, among the Southern Slavs, as well as in different regions of Russia [42]. The basis was laid for seeing the Russian system in the context of historical and evolutionary processes, demonstrating similarities between peasant institutions of societies which were at different levels of development.

The approach to social change that emphasized the role in history of peasant agricultural communes, and viewed the institutions of primitive (kinship organized) societies in this way, implicitly divorced the evolution of economic and social structures from political institutions. This contributed to a tendency towards "economic determinist" interpretations of social evolution, exemplified, for instance, by Nikolai Ziber (Sieber), whose book, *Essays in Primitive Economic Culture* (*Ocherki pervobytnoi ekonomicheskoi kul'tury*). was the first attempt to give a Marxian analysis of "the socioeconomic formation of primitive society." Published in 1883, one year before Engels' book *Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, Ziber's work was not only independent of Lewis Henry Morgan, but utilized a fund of ethnographic materials on subsistence activities and processes of production and distribution unknown to Engels [43].

This tendency to think of a collective group of kin as a particular economic organization synonymous with "pre-class society," and, therefore, to conceive of primitive society as a system of economic communes, became during the 1930s the cornerstone of the Soviet doctrine of primitive communalism. The conceptualization of the structure of primitive society as a particular *institution*, to which the term *rod* (unilineal kingroup, in its unimpaired form always matrilineal [44]), became attached, has been the source of misunderstanding and confusion.

Thus, Ziber introduced into Russian Marxism the perception that the primordial foundation of society was a commune organized by relations for collective labor and communistic distribution of the collective product. On the basis of his identification of the commune as an economic nucleus, he constructed a typology of stages from the "herd alliances" of the savage through the kingroups of tribal peoples to the territorial communes of the Russian peasantry.

During the 1930s, A.M. Zolotarëv further developed the commune idea, introducing into Soviet history of primitive society the thesis that "exogamy" arose as a means to link communes economically through marriage ties [45]. This became the basis for speculation that primordial society itself arose through linking two formerly inbreeding "herds" to form a "dual-kingroup collective," thereby subordinating relations for reproduction wholly to relations for production [46]. In the beginning, spouses remained in their

natal communes, so that kinship by "blood" traced through the mothers was the only type recognized. "Moieties" were claimed to represent "superstructural survivals" from this era, which was reflected in consciousness by an all-pervasive conceptual dualism (the development of this scheme culminated in Semënov's fanciful model summarized below).

In the USSR, Ziber is frequently cited to illustrate that in their encounters with Marx's thinking, Russian intellectuals did not at first distinguish "the dialectic" from evolutionary theory [47]. Marxism to them was merely evolutionary theory applied to the study of socioeconomic systems. In general, it seems that in Russia, Marxism was not perceived by sectors of the intelligentsia as a totalizing system of thought prior to the founding of a messianic movement, whose particular mission it alone could articulate.

This occurred around the turn of the century, with the founding of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party dedicated to the mediation of proletarian revolution. The world renewal mission articulated for them by Marx's teachings was based on the proposition that in the act of overthrowing the bourgeoisie the proletariat puts an end to classes in general, including itself as a class, and alone is vested by "history" with the power to represent the interests of society as a whole [48]. Grasping this "dialectic" (negation) enabled one to transcend "positivist evolutionism."

On the other hand, Marx was widely read in Russia, perhaps more so than in the West, and he influenced the thinking of many intellectuals, who had no interest in proletarian revolution. The issue was too remote in a country where even conservatives were morally revolted by capitalism. Indeed, it was the very remoteness of a political revolution that lent to Marx's writings on economics and history the appeal of abstract theory. In this guise, Marx and Engels influenced men like Maxim Kovalevsky, who combined radical evolutionist social theories with elitist or even totalitarian political views.

At the end of the last century, Kovalevsky (1851–1916) was perhaps the leading Russian theoretician of primitive society and social evolution, and certainly the best known outside Russia, where he was generally thought of as a sociologist rather than ethnographer [49]. We cite here a passage from a work he published in 1896 on the origins and evolution of the family and property relations, because it exemplifies a totalizing conception of evolutionary theory widely shared among Russian social scientists around the turn of the century [50]:

> In our time progress can be defined as the continuous internally generated development of those prolific shoots planted long ago by our ancestors. The notion that everything can be redone, creating instantaneously a new order of things, a new religion or a new morality, has nothing in common with our views. But while there is no place in the modern theory of evolution for huge mutations in social life, it rejects equally the notion that things never change. In it the present is but a condition of the impending future, which must alter all aspects of our common existence to a very considerable extent. With respect to practical life, evolutionary philosophy has set itself the important task of facilitating transition to a better social order. As regards its theoretical pretensions, it studies the past in order to foresee the future.

THE ETHNOGRAPHIC TRADITION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

At the beginning of this century, ethnography in Russia was characterized by "pluralism." Each ethnographer tended to go his or her own way with respect to theory and methods. In part, this reflected the appearance of a true "middle class" as the result of rapid capitalist industrialization and substantial increase in the number of men and women from nongentry backgrounds with secondary and higher education. The fate of the commune was being settled by the penetration of commodity production into the village, relegating the traditional peasantry to a past that no longer had any future. Urban

revolutionaries (Social Democrats and Bundists) distrusted the mass of the peasantry, self-sufficient small landholders who farmed communal allotments. They viewed the better-off peasants as the class enemy in the villages. The only portion of the peasantry who seemed to have a revolutionary potential were the "semi-proletarians": those who had either lost their land or who had plots too small to support their family and pay their taxes.

On the other hand, many among the bourgeoisie were interested in the "cultural heritage" of their people, motivated by nationalist sentiments. These sentiments were stronger among certain of the larger non-Russian nationalities in the Tsarist "Prison of Nations" (Ukrainians, Poles, Volga Tatars, Balts, several Finnish nationalities, Georgians and Armenians). The concern with folkways was reflected in the proliferation of collectors of local lore, a trend encouraged by Prince Tenishev's Ethnographic Bureau [51].

Probably the factor most responsible for theoretical and methodological pluralism in Russia on the eve of the 1917 Revolution was the lack of professional training. Courses in ethnography were offered as part of training in geography and philology, and ethnographic materials were widely used in the teaching of history, sociology and economics. Therefore, as Nikolai Marr was later to write [52], "ethnographers... are usually amateur enthusiasts, scholars without any particular professional qualifications."

Immediately after the Revolution, the status of ethnography improved, and for about a dozen years thereafter, it was recognized as an independent science. Russian ethnography was centered in Leningrad at the Institute of Geography, where Shternberg established the first Faculty of Ethnography in 1918 (the Institute became the Geography Faculty of Leningrad University with a Department of Ethnography in 1925; in 1929, the program, fundamentally altered, was transferred to the Institute of History and Linguistics, and was finally abolished in 1932); at the Institute of the Peoples of the North, the Museum of the Peoples of the USSR (the Russian Museum), and the Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography (MAE) of the Academy of Sciences staffed and run through the Department; at the Institute for the Study of the People of the USSR based on the pre-revolutionary KIPS (Commission for Study of the Ethnic Composition of the Peoples of Russia of the Academy of Sciences [53]) founded by Academician Sergei F. Ol'denburg (1863–1934), which in 1933 merged with the MAE to form the Institute of Anthropology and Ethnography; and at the State Academy (later, Institute) of the History of Material Culture nominally headed by Academician Marr [54].

In the early years of Bolshevik rule, ethnographers trained in Leningrad helped to extend the Revolution to a number of localities and ethnic groups of North Russia and Siberia. They contributed to shaping and applying Soviet nationalist policies in the most isolated and primitive districts of the country, setting up the first schools in which they often became the first teachers in the native languages, using textbooks they helped to write in alphabets they had designed. When not teaching, they gathered data necessary to develop economic and political programs for the northern and eastern peripheries. For instance, ethnography students carried out the 1926–27 census in northeastern Siberia, where conditions demanded individuals not afraid to travel hundreds of kilometers by dog sled in winter and by small boat in summer, and able to win the confidence and understanding of the local populations [55].

All this, in addition to conducting ethnographic research based on a common program and methods, facilitated comparison of results obtained in widely different parts of the country. As early as 1922–23, Bogoraz sent some eighty students from the Ethnography

Faculty to work in far-off regions.

These were young men and women motivated by the highest ideals. They were expected to be broadly educated in natural history, psychology, economics and linguistics as well as in "the general history of culture," and also to possess technical skills, such as the ability to survey by line of sight, to make the necessary measurements, to draw a map, to sketch and photograph objects. Shternberg demanded of his students that they should display the erudition of scholars together with the enterprise of practical doers. He held that true ethnographers lived among the people they studied for long periods, spoke their language fluently, and knew how to help them. All students of the Institute had to spend three months in the field every summer combining observations with teaching.

The program did not conform to the prerevolutionary conception of scholarship, nor were its graduates old-type intellectuals. The spirit was rather that of the *Narodnik* mission, to which both Shternberg and Bogoraz had dedicated their youth [56].

Ethnography, as a science established in the wake of the Revolution, all but guaranteed the elimination of "ethnographic pluralism" in the central institutions, if not in all the provinces. Both Shternberg and Anuchin (see [57]) subscribed to variants of cultural evolutionism. But while they perceived themselves and were perceived by others to be adherents of the "classical school," associated with such men as Edward Tylor and Paul Broca (Shternberg's views were closer to the former, Anuchin's to the latter), cultural evolution was understood by them in a way that was unusually comprehensive, presented in uncompromising language with a missionary zeal frequently encountered among Russian intellectuals.

Thus, Anuchin saw in "anthropology" the "synthesis of the biological and humanitarian sciences," and sought in his research to encompass "humankind as a whole in its physical and spiritual make-up," combining physical ("somatic") anthropological studies with investigation of material and mental culture, in historical, ethnographic and archaeological dimensions [57].

If anything, Shternberg was more extreme than Anuchin. Like Anuchin's "anthropology," "ethnography" was a unified science of the development of human culture, which he conceived as the ability of people to find creative solutions to problems posed by their condition of existence. Culture evolved by selective retention of adaptively superior solutions under pressure of the environment, which included both natural forces and changes introduced by people. All differences in culture resulted from transient factors, differences in geography and historical conditions, not differences in the psyche of "primitive" and "civilized" peoples. Therefore, Shternberg did not accept the notion of a prelogical "primitive mind," associated with Levy-Bruhl, but rooted (in different form) in French and Russian cultures, or of racially determined cultural characteristics. Since ethnography compels people to recognize functional interdependence of phenomena of social life and the order in which they develop, the ethnographer "is the enemy of every type of conservatism." As a conditional process, evolution is not uniform, and people do not all have to pass through every stage on their own. Unlike history, which studies only "elected peoples" within a framework that, moreover, does not encompass culture as such, ethnography studies the development of all peoples, from the earliest periods to the present, as it is revealed in their unique cultures. Therefore, it alone is capable of revealing the most general laws of evolution of humanity. Summarizing Shternberg's legacy, Gagen-Torn wrote [58]:

> His scientific research was aimed at grounding ethical truths, which had to be understood to carry on the struggle for freedom and equal rights of all humanity. He considered that any investigation of a people's culture should assist them to become part of a single human family, to find their place in a single developing humanity.

In hindsight it is easy to see that the "science of ethnography" (anthropology) as conceived and practiced by the "Leningrad school" of the 1920s was bound to conflict with "Party-spirit" (*partiĭnost'*) and result in its replacement by academic ethnography subordinate to history. Shternberg (and in theory at least, Anuchin) offered a scientifically grounded totalizing theory of human development for the revolutionary mission alternative to "historical materialism". The potential threat to Party doctrine posed by this alternative was not just academic: ethnographers trained in this uncompromisingly radical cultural evolutionism were in a unique position to detect phenomena for which a "cultural-ecological" explanation might prove superior to "class analysis" [59].

However, the split here was not truly theoretical. Indeed, one could argue that an analysis of human societies as ecological systems based on the notion that they function "culturally" would greatly enrich Marxism. In recent years, Eduard Markarian has proposed just such an approach (see below). But even in the early 1920s, Nikolai Bukharin attempted to construct something like an ecological systems interpretation of mode-of-production and socioeconomic formation categories [60]. Admittedly, this attempt was not very successful, in part because Bukharin chose a "mechanical" model as an explanatory device. The association of ecological-functional explanations of social phenomena with Bukharin was ultimately to have a negative effect on the development of ethnographic theory.

The real issue was the reluctance of practicing scientists to recognize the Party's claim to a monopoly on Truth [61]. To ethnographers and other social scientists oriented to field observations, Marxism was of necessity a *method* of research and analysis, which had to be integrated with methods for generating data specific to the subject matter studied. Like any other scientific theory, it had to be open to test and correction through hypothesis-formulation. For instance, Bogoraz termed Marxism a method for "classification, explanation and tying together of ethnographic phenomena" more refined than the older "comparative-historical" method, the application of which in the USSR was made possible by the vast accumulation of ethnographic data [62]. This understanding was encouraged by Bukharin's "mechanistic" interpretations [63].

When in the 1960s the discussions on socioeconomic formations, cut off in the early 1930s, were reopened (see below), they returned eventually to the point, where the issue was whether the sequence of five formations (primitive-communal, slaveholding, feudal, capitalist, communist) is to be viewed as a matter of doctrine or merely a generalization of the historical evidence achieved by applying Marxian theory and method. Inevitably, this raised by implication the issue of whether Marxism is a philosophy of being ("matter") providing answers on all questions or a theory and method in feedback with practice.

But, in contrast to the 1920s, this was not a subject that could be openly debated in the 1960s, since loss of their monopoly on doctrinal interpretation could undermine the authority of the Party leaders, and present a challenge to the legitimacy of the entire apparatus of power. Undoubtedly this explains why the *apparatchiki* were unwilling to "rehabilitate" Bukharin (Stalin had him shot in 1938), even though it is rumored Khrushchev was willing. He remains a "non-person" in the USSR, so that his name never appears in the discussion.

But his influence was felt, nonetheless, most notably in the paper of Danilova in PIDO Two so frequently referred to (see below), where it is disguised by references to Bogdanov. Indirectly, at least, the "reformers" were going back to Bukharin by identifying themselves with the intellectual life of the

1920s rather than with the discussions of the early 1930s.

By the mid-1930s, Marx's theory and method had been transformed into a monolithic doctrine of the ruling party, which quite against the will of individuals responsible for this conversion, had evolved features typical of the dogma of a state religion. One consequence was the tendency to perceive competing theory and method as fraudulent dogmas inspiring deviations, whose advocates by logical extension became vessels of iniquity, *vrediteli* ("those who damage the collective welfare," often translated as "wreckers") [64]. Naturally, the greatest danger emanated from versions of Marxism that deviated from doctrine.

Description of this process lies beyond the scope of our article. Yet in so far as it largely determined the course taken by Soviet ethnographic science, we feel some analysis of the events and their consequences is necessary. Therefore, we will briefly touch on the discussions about the nature and role of ethnography and the ensuing institutional changes [65].

THE CONVERSION TO MARXISM

The forced conversion of ethnography was but one aspect of the changes associated with the abandoned attempt to get to socialism gradually and indirectly in exchange for a direct "assault on the heights." This entailed forced collectivization of the peasantry to achieve "primitive socialist accumulation" of capital needed to build an industrial base in the shortest time [66]. The corresponding efforts to develop and apply theories and methods in the sciences based on "dialectical and historical materialism," which began in the realm of relatively free debate and innovative research, were cut off by institutional reforms that in effect "froze" these promising shoots before they could flower. The novel theory and method was condemned to a sort of permanent immaturity.

The history of theory and method in the social sciences of the Soviet Union can be divided into phases. The early years of Soviet power to 1928 was a phase of discovery, education and persuasion, followed by institutional takeover and conversion, in the years 1929 to 1932, to historical materialism. The victors in the struggle with "bourgeois science" had little time to celebrate: as Party intellectuals upholding the aims and values of the revolutionary years, many of the leaders of the Party takeover were prime targets of Stalin's drive to convert the Party into his tool run by the *apparatchiki*, who owed allegiance to no one besides Stalin himself. Along with the leaders of the takeover, some of whom had been Marxists not affiliated with the Bolsheviks at the time of the Revolution, their students were subject to repression [67]. Conversely, conservative older scholars, whose careers had been established before the Revolution and who had been subjected to severe, often humiliating criticism during the takeover phase, were generally restored to their academic positions, provided they had survived [68].

It was during this phase, lasting from approximately 1936 to 1949, when identity was established between theory and ideology as interpreted by the Party in the person of Stalin. The "orthodox" habits of thinking and forms of expression that can burden even the most creative Soviet theoreticians became entrenched in those years. At no other time in Soviet history did Marxism so resemble a surrogate religious dogma. So long as the consequences of those years survive in a "canonical" theory collectively upheld by Party leaders, the hiatus in the normal growth of scientific theory and method will be extremely difficult to overcome.

A limited rebirth of theoretical questioning occurred after 1950. During the first decade, the debate was so constrained by unstated assumptions of orthodoxy that much of it appeared ritualistic even to its participants. But during the 1960s, a real if limited

re-examination of principles developed, culminating in the volume *Problems in the History of Pre-Capitalist Society*, known according to its Russian abbreviation as *PIDO* Number Two [69].

"De-Stalinization" began to slow down after the dismissal of Khrushchev in 1964. There was a reaction against the "excesses" of the reformers. However, there was no return to the Stalin period. The status quo ante sustained by the emerging conservative consensus encompassed reforms carried out in the previous decade. Excluding a handful of individuals, who had been closest to Stalin and/or most implicated in his crimes, a revival of terror and despotism was not in the interests of even the most ardent conservatives, "neo-Stalinists" included.

To employ a metaphor of those days, the thaw was not followed by spring. And as had occurred in the analogous false springs of the nineteenth century [70], interpretation of history became the arena of intense disagreement between reformers and conservatives. Just as in the earlier division into Westernizer and Slavophile trends, which this conflict of ideas is said to echo [71], the arguments tended to be framed in absolutes. Thus, when in her contribution to PIDO Two, which set the tone for the entire collection, L.V. Danilova argued for shared features in the relations of production of all precapitalist societies, justifying their inclusion in a single "big socioeconomic formation" opposed to capitalism, it was widely recognized that a fundamental re-evaluation of pre-revolutionary Russian society was implied, and by extension, of the Soviet system [72].

DISCUSSIONS ON FORMATIONS, PERIODIZATION, AND DEFINITION OF ETHNOGRAPHY

One function of discussions on periodization of history is the establishment of foolproof schema to which "research workers" and, especially, instructors can refer whenever doubts arise concerning the "correct" attitude to some phenomenon or event. In other words, "Party spirit" is embodied in that classification, which sets the "line" in the interpretation of the past. This is why such discussions tended to erupt when Party policy was least certain. In these conditions, debate can become an exercise in "reinsurance" (*perestrakhovka*), as it did among ethnographers and prehistorians in the early 1930s. As a central figure in the debate concerning the nature and stages in development of "preclass society" said in 1932 [73]:

> The question of the fundamental laws of development of preclass society is of the utmost importance methodologically, and we are required to attend to it most diligently just now, when sharply drawn, clearly defined, authenticated Marxist-Leninist methodological principles are absolutely essential to the science of the history of preclass society... A mistaken understanding of the essence of development of preclass society and the principles of its periodization could have consequences – I am not exaggerating – that are absolutely fatal.

The discussions on periodization were linked to debate over definitions of socioeconomic formations, the major categories of Marxian theory within which societies are classified and studied. Together, resolution of rather artificially generated disagreements on these issues served as the vehicle through which "Party spirit" was inculcated into the social sciences [74].

From the standpoint of both the "Old Bolshevik" theoreticians and the new Party bureaucrats, pragmatic and often anti-intellectual, the problem was mainly organizational: determination of the hierarchical order in which individual sciences were subordinated "methodologically," i.e., to doctrine, hence, to control by the Party. To be sure, "control" meant different things to the Old Bolsheviks, for whom fidelity to Marxist theory and the revolutionary traditions of the Party was central, and to the new generation of *apparatchiki*, for whom retention of power was the principal issue [75].

According to the Soviet conception of Marxism as a unified theory to explain the "essence" of reality that emerged at this time [76], this order was thought to reflect the really-existing dialectic manifest in specific "motions of matter." Each form of the motion of matter appears as a "unity and struggle of opposites" that evolves new features until such time as it is transcended and subsumed through "negation" of its form to initiate a new motion in a universal system. Thus, the laws specific to atomic, molecular, organismic and societal "motions of matter" are investigated by physical, chemical, biological and social sciences, respectively. The special theories of these sciences are integrated by the doctrine of "dialectical and historical materialism," disclosing in the unity and opposition of nature and society the most general laws of existence. Theory and method were thereby totalized in Marxist-Leninist doctrine [77].

One aspect of the inculcation of doctrine was abolition of both ethnography and archaeology as independent sciences. They were reorganized as "auxiliary disciplines" of history, to which they were subordinated "methodologically." The Leningrad School of Ethnography founded by Shternberg was closed.

Ostensibly, these moves were in response to decisions of the All-Russian Archaeological-Ethnographic Conference of May 7–11, 1932. But this conference's resolutions seem to have ratified decisions already taken. The conference "settled" once and for all the question of the place of ethnography among the sciences in favor of the historians, several of whom were appointed by the Party to oversee reorganization after the failure of the Leningrad Conference of 1929 to arrive at an acceptable decision. Apparently, that conference had been dominated by field ethnographers and theoreticians who shared their views.

Debate on the resolutions of the 1932 conference was not without acrimony, and its passage appears to have required arm-twisting. Supporters of the resolutions argued that neither living cultures nor material remains of past human activity are endowed with "motions" of their own: rather, they undergo change, or are the record of changes made, in response to social forces. Consequently, no ethnographical or archaeological "laws" await discovery, so that no "subject matter" exists to quality these sciences for independent status.

It was resolved that, when removed from the web of social relations within which individuals satisfy their needs, the products of human creativity are deprived of their true meanings. Therefore, the social matrix within which they originate and function must be taken as the starting point for investigation. Since this matrix was determined by the structure of the socioeconomic formation of which the phenomenon in question is a particular manifestation, it should be studied as integral to the history of that formation, one of the many forms of its appearance.

Paragraph 25 of the resolution on ethnography reads in part [78]:

> The construction of ethnography as an independent science with its own subject matter and methods of research that contrast with or are on par with history violates the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the dialectic of the historical process, comprising the successive replacement of socioeconomic formations in conformity with natural-historical laws. While not slighting the importance of so-called ethnographical material, from the standpoint of Marxism-Leninism, ethnography can have the status only of an auxiliary discipline contributing to historical investigations by the collection in the field and the primary classification of direct observations on the life and customs of living peoples.

In paragraph 31 of this resolution, the problems studied with the aid of ethnography were defined as [79]:

> a) the process of ethnogenesis and spread of ethnic and national groups; b) material production in its concrete variants; c) origin of the family [80]; d) origin of classes;

> e) origin and forms of religion, art, laws and other superstructural phenomena; f) forms of the dissolution of primitive communist and feudal societies in the conditions of capitalist encirclement; g) forms of the direct transition to socialism, bypassing capitalism, of pre-capitalist societies; h) the construction of cultures that are national in form and socialist in content.

The period from 1934 to 1950 was the most dismal in the history of Russian ethnography. The nearly complete cessation of ethnographic fieldwork broke tradition. "Theory" consisted mainly in raging against "apologists for colonialism and racism" in the West, who were indeed numerous in those years, which accusation was extended to include every trend from British functional-structuralism to migrationism and diffusionism [81]. The "culture area" concept was denounced and no explanation for development of "material and spiritual culture" (a Soviet idiom) was permitted except by "internal dialectic" from one doctrinally-defined "stage" to the next. Since only autochthonous evolution was recognized, historical studies of actual ethnic communities were all but abandoned in favor of the reconstruction of abstract stages that tied together evolution of language, thinking and social structures.

Concerning this period, Yulian Bromley writes [82]:

> ... a tendency was in evidence to narrow the concept of ethnography as a science, eliminating those of its fields which formally are beyond the frame of the historical sciences. As a result, studies of the contemporary way of life of the peoples of the Soviet Union and other countries came virtually to a standstill.

In recent decades, the alliance of Soviet ethnography with history has spawned large amounts and varieties of ethnographic research. If at first the outcome was quite different, the reasons should be sought mainly outside of science.

One factor that must be considered is timing: ethnography became a historical science at the moment when honest reporting on the daily life of the peasants or the hunting and herding peoples in Siberia and Central Asia had become a potentially subversive act. Research was restricted to "discovering" "survivals" of the doctrinally-dictated stages of the unilineal kingroup (*rodovoi*) system through which all peoples had passed. Therefore, "history" was construed as the illustration of an abstract scheme of universal evolution.

Of all scientists, ethnographers were in the best position to see, understand and judge the impact of collectivization on the peasants' way of life. Then, too, labor camps were set up in regions that were home to the hunting, fishing and herding peoples who were prime targets of ethnographic research. The demoralizing and even devastating effects of the concentration of huge numbers of half-starved semislaves in areas barely able to support the aborigines can only be imagined: destruction of environments and plundering of resources on which these groups depended by camp administrations that ran huge areas virtually as private fiefs, and were frequently prejudiced against non-Russians, was only one aspect. Nor should the intervention of the secret police in the western, southern, and eastern border regions be overlooked [83].

A factor of great importance was the limitation of the historical frame itself. The transformation of theory into doctrine involved not only hypostatizing an interpretation of Marx, but all other theories as well, turning them into opposing doctrine. Thus, "historical materialism" was opposed to "geographical materialism," making it an ideological deviation to stress that such factors as the type and availability of resources or climate may contribute more than incidentally to shaping a people's daily life (*byt*) [84]. The identification of "dialectic" with "internal contradiction" in opposition to the "mechanistic theory" of "external contradictions" excluded the suggestion made by Bukharin in 1921 to account for the long-term stability of seemingly conflict-riven

societies that social systems may be functionally adapted within particular ecological-historical "environments" through a "collective exchange of materials" mediated by technological subsystems. Such exchanges, he argued, adapt social systems by adapting their environments to create dynamic equilibria, society "not only becoming subject to the action of nature, as a material, but simultaneously transforming nature into a material for human action" [85]. "Dialectic" was also interpreted to exclude explanations for cultural phenomena that presumed migration or the diffusion of traits in so far as the latter could then not be derived through the working out of contradictions inside the system [86].

In the 1930s, the very word "culture" became suspect through its opposition to "social" in migrationist and diffusionist explanations for the distribution of observed features of social life [87]. As an ethnographical and archaeological term, "culture" came to be identified with "bourgeois formalism" and "thing-worship" (*veshchevedenie*). Association of the latter with the "typological method" had the effect of discouraging primary analysis of material through classification to extract data. This was probably a greater threat to survival of both ethnography and archaeology than restrictions on field work, which never extended to all types even in ethnography, much less to prehistoric archaeology, and contributed greatly to the absolutizing of speculative theories [88].

Finally, a factor to consider in the emergence of the fundamentalist attitude was the manner in which definitions for "socio-economic formations" were rendered. This task and its goals were determined less by a crisis in scientific theory than by a crisis within the social order that was reflected as a split inside the ruling hierarchy. The apparent failure of the economic policy pursued from 1921 to 1927, followed by a return to extreme measures against the peasants to increase grain deliveries, precipitated a breakdown in the alliance between Bukharin and Stalin. As before and after in Russian history, differences of opinion were absolutized into irreconcilable alternative interpretatons of Russia's past and current situation.

Thus, the "formations" debate flared up over the question of the so-called "Asiatic Formation," which while initiated by a discussion on China [89], actually considered whether Russian development had followed an "Eastern" or "Western" pattern. Opponents of the "Asiatic Formation" sought to resolve the problem by eliminating the question: no developmental pathway existed besides variants on the four stages (commencing with primitive communalism and culminating with capitalism) through which Western European societies had passed. Behind this solution lay another question: could socialism be constructed in Russia without revolution in the West? Elimination of the "Asiatic Formation" undercut theoretical objections of the "Westernizers" to "Socialism in One Country," and set Russia on a common course with Western Europe.

The political conclusion to the "Asiatic Formation" debate [90] affected both the definition of "pre-class" society and its periodization. The "Primitive Communal Formation" had to be structured and developed in a way that precluded emergence of the state in an "Asiatic" form, and conversely, gave rise to the "Slaveholding/Feudal/Capitalist" progression of class formations. Thus, the origin of the state was shown to be a consequence of the division of society into classes based on the emergence of private property in the means of production. That in turn favored the formulation into doctrine of a progression from "matriarchy" to "patriarchy" in the development and dissolution of unilineal kingroup society, since the shift to patrilineal descent was linked by Engels with transfer of property right from the kingroup

to the household, within which rules of inheritance from father to son prevail. Rationalization of doctrine requires removal of possible sources of logical inconsistency, a "logic" that also seems to underlie Yuri Semënov's speculations on human emergence and sequencing of primitive history (see below) [91].

The definition of the Primitive Communal Formation, its periodization, and the analysis of its dissolution and replacement by class society worked out in the early 1930s, were not only more rigorously formulated with respect to Marxist theory and method than the evolutionist social theories inherited from before the Revolution, but broke with these theories on a number of fundamental issues. Thus, in several influential textbooks published during the 1920s, connection between private property in the means of production and emergence within primitive society of classes and the state was explicitly denied [92]. Typically, in these texts social evolution was presented abstractly, as a sequence of "social forms" that reproduced an ideal history supposedly revealing the pattern common to the history of all societies. In the name of this "universal history," particular histories were given little attention. For a time, teaching of history was actually abolished in the secondary schools, being replaced at first by courses in "political literacy" (*politgramota*) and later, by "social science." In part this can be explained by the dismissal after the Revolution of most secondary school history teachers. At the university level, few historians lost their jobs [93].

Since disagreements over the definition and sequencing of "socioeconomic formations" ultimately refer back to alternative interpretations of Russian history, the issues of whether systematic exploitation arises with the division of society into economic classes on the basis of private ownership of the means of production or can arise in the absence of private property, and of the relationship between division of society into classes and origins of the state, tend to re-emerge. In the early 1960s, it took the form of a revival of the "Asiatic Formation" debate. Significantly, "reformers" behaved as if they were continuing an intellectual tradition established in the 1920s, before the campaign to inculcate the historical sciences in "Party spirit," rather than picking up on the dialogue concerning doctrine broken off in the 1930s [94].

It is apparent that a consensus currently exists among Soviet historians that systematic exploitation associated with the rudiments of a state apparatus can emerge in conditions which preclude private ownership of the means of production. On the other hand, all societies recognized to have been early states are consigned to a Slaveholding Formation, the definition of which has been expanded to accommodate them [95]. This necessitated the ill-defined formulation in the 1960s of a lengthy "transition period" from the Primitive Communal to the Slaveholding Formation [96]. But this solution does not undercut doctrine, since the universal world-historical development of class society from slavery to capitalism does not include a formation based on modes of production in which relations of exploitation are rooted in collective (state or communal) ownership of the means of production.

Turning from the end to the beginning of primitive communalism, it is apparent that Soviet scientists confronted a rather different set of doctrinal problems. The first determined when to apply the doctrine of socioeconomic formations. The answer to this question depended on where the lower boundary of the "Primitive Communal Formation" was placed.

According to Vladislav Ravdonikas, the scientist probably most responsible for the doctrine of "primitive history" [97], at this boundary "laws" (*zakony*) specific to the formation, development and replacement of

human societies superceded "laws" of biology in guiding human evolution. Humans, therefore, emerged as the result of a dialectical "leap" (*skachok*) from a biological to a sociological "motion of matter."

It appears that the notion that humans emerged as the result of a "qualitative leap" was first elaborated by Ravdonikas. In his report previously cited, he argued [98]:

> When the beginning phases in the development of society are portrayed, there is a tendency to stress only herd-like features that human groups shared with the animal world, such as subsistence from hand-to-mouth (*prostoe sobiratel'stvo*). This tends to cloud the dialectic of the emergence of human society, masking the immense dialectical leap taken by matter in its development from a biological to a sociological form... The very fact that instruments of labor were being made is of colossal importance. From the outset the forces of production were developing inside these primitive communist groups in the guise of cooperation during labor, the accumulation of production experience, improvements in techniques of production and the inauguration of new types of production, which brought them into conflict with the relations of production of hand-to-mouth foraging, elementary and wholly immediate in form, lacking a division of labor. The developing forces of production required more highly organized labor, more efficient relations of production. For instance, the regular hunting of large animals was unthinkable without a division of labor... There could be but one resolution to the basic contradiction of the first stage of preclass society (in my periodization): emergence of new types of relations of production. A division of labor in its elementary form, by age, class and sex, made its appearance.

While much has changed in the Soviet understanding of human emergence since this was written, the idea of dialectical leaps in the form of "breaks" is still widely shared. On the other hand, the nature and extent of "breaks" is a matter of dispute. In general, however, they are thought to be represented by certain discontinuities in the archaeological and paleontological records of human evolution, which reflect the process of evolution and do not merely reflect the character of the records themselves. Much evidence has been accumulated and interpreted in support of such "breaks" (*perelomy*).

The first of these evolutionary breaks is associated with the appearance of humans in connection with the fashioning of instruments of labor out of rock (in particular, regular production of "tools to make tools"), which is viewed as the specific condition for technology [99]. The second is thought to have occurred when the Primitive Communal Formation became fully established, thereby completing the transition from biological to social evolution. This evolutionary event is seen as having been coincident with the appearance of the modern human species, *Homo sapiens*. Therefore, the majority of Soviet physical anthropologists and Paleolithic archaeologists differentiate populations of *Homo sapiens* older than about 40,000 years into a separate species, *Homo neanderthalensis* [100].

The one-and-a-half million years separating these two evolutionary events (each lasting several millenia) are viewed as a period of transition during which evolution by natural selection of individuals and groups was increasingly constrained and channeled by the effects of growth of the forces of production. Since such growth is measured by the accumulation of social experience in the form of new instruments of labor, techniques and types of production, it is based on the exogenic (extragenetic) processing of information, and takes place, therefore, relatively independently of alterations in the gene pool.

On the other hand, in so far as the initially limited capability of ancestral human populations for production constrained its development, humans must have periodically come under strong selection to adapt them for labor. According to Yuri Semënov, this selection was essentially "preadaptive" so that the species would have been maintained in relative genetic equilibrium on an adaptive plateau until the behavioral capacity was used up by development of production. A period of rapid genetic shift would then follow as groups containing individuals with superior capabilities increased their representation in the gene pool. He termed this as evolution

taking place by a process of "biosocial selection" [101].

These propositions can be related to the restructuring of theory of human emergence currently taking place in the USSR, yet they do not acutally occur in the writings of Soviet theoreticians of "primitive history." They must be *inferred* from a discourse reminiscent of speculations in a nineteenth century Philosophy of History, in which the deductive categories of The Dialectic are presented as the revealed truth explaining the observed events. For instance, concerning the evolutionary event associated with emergence of humans, Semënov actually wrote [102]:

> From the very beginning production activity contradicted this ["conditioned reflex"] form, which, however, did not wholly exclude development of the activity. But sooner or later this extremely limited possibility for development was exhausted. At some quite definite point, the further improvement of production activity within the animal shell became absolutely impossible. The liberation of this activity from its animal form, its transformation into a conscious, willed activity, became unavoidable. Naturally this presupposed restructuring the morphological organization of the producing beings, above all, of their brain structure. Thus, while production activity arose with the habilines [*Australopithecus habilis*], it began to grow into conscious and willed activity only with the transition to the pithecanthropines [*Homo erectus*].

Presentation of ideas in this form seriously impedes communication between purveyors of Party doctrine "with scientific degrees," even when they are as skilled and articulate as Semënov, as well as non-Soviet scientists investigating emergence and evolution of humans and human society, who must work with the theory and methods of evolutionary ecology and anthropological archaeology. It is particularly distressing to non-Soviet Marxists, trained to regard such speculations as objective idealism, or Marxism turned back on its Hegelian head. This undoubtedly was an underlying cause of the friction between Yuri Semënov and the French Marxist anthropologist, Maurice Godelier, at the conference in Burg Wartenstein in 1976 [103].

It is true that the best Soviet theoreticians are extremely proficient at such arguments [104]. During the 1950s and 1960s, they debated among themselves such basic issues in these speculations as the occurrence of one or two "breaks," the structure of the Primitive Communal Formation (referred to below), the antiquity of the "pair-bonded family" and whether it was preceded by "promiscuity" [105].

On one issue there is virtual unanimity among Soviet scientists, nonfundamentalists and fundamentalists alike: the emergence of human beings and human society as ultimately determined by a formation of forces of production, which gave rise to the relations of production of the first mode of production [106]. Although the "Labor Theory of Anthroposociogenesis" is a component of Party doctrine (its central propositions formulated by Marx and Engels [107]), it would be safe to say that it is no longer accepted for doctrinal reasons, but simply because it is the best explanation available.

For a time, the explanation for human emergence most widespread in the United States and Great Britain connected it with making tools and weapons to hunt large game [108]. Under the influence of discoveries about instrumental capabilities and hunting by nonhuman primates and the absence (or discrediting) of evidence on tool-making and hunting by Australopithecines older than two million years, however, this idea lost popularity in the 1970s and was replaced by various sociobiological speculations [109].

From a Soviet perspective, the theory of tool-making and using associated with hunting was unsophisticated, an example of "mechanistic evolutionism." It bore little similarity to the 50-year-old development of the Theory of Labor, which was concerned with the origins of production rather than tools. Almost no work has been done by scientists investigating human origins on the Labor Theory either in this country or in Great Britain [110].

Since it has been Semënov's task to rationalize doctrinal revelations, he tends to elaborate those aspects of doctrine that many Soviet ethnographers and archaeologists find most objectionable. Two such aspects of doctrine stand out: the concepts of the "primeval human herd" (also referred to as the "horde-stage theory") and of "group marriage" and the "matrilineal kingroup" as primordial features of primitive communal society.

Summarized here is the five-hundred page model of human emergence in which he sought to totalize and rationalize the fundamentalist doctrine, both to illustrate the absurd lengths to which the fundamentalists have gone to defend their positions, and because for this very reason, Semënov's model epitomizes all the nonfundamentalists' objections. Therefore, his model can serve to introduce the fundamentalist doctrine, whose demolition is the subject of the section on kinship studies, below [111].

According to Semënov's original thesis (he has since modified it considerably), emerging human society became established when both preferential sexual access of dominant males and unrestrained sexual activity began to be curbed through the collective suppression of aggressive behavior within a group of cooperating individuals. The condition so created he termed "promiscuity," because it resulted in partial curbing of "zoological individualism" without establishing "marriage" or any other regulation of social-sexual relations required for the existence of fully-formed human society [112].

Emerging society was, therefore, initially "amorphous," little organized beyond day-to-day interactions. Through time it became increasingly organized with the aid of social-sexual "taboos" that placed more numerous restraints on the operation of "zoological individualism" within the group, until in late "Mousterian times" (Middle Paleolithic), a situation arose in which human groups were so highly organized they had become virtually closed inbreeding "protocommunes" sharing a totemic identity [113]. Further development of production activity finally transformed these communes into economic units from which sexual behavior was entirely excluded by taboos.

Continued reproduction and replication of the economic unit necessitated mating outside the commune. Initially, this led to "orgiastic assaults" by males on females belonging to other communes; however, under pressure to increase reproduction and maintain group size, matings between communes began to be regularized by rules joining the males of one commune with the females of another in "dislocal marriage," so called because neither spouse resided in the other spouse's commune.

Further development of this system led to its stabilization in the form of "dual-unilineal kingroup collectives" [114], the first society completely organized by socioeconomic relations. On the basis of "group marriage," males took up at least temporary residence in their wives' communes rather than vice versa, because bonds within the commune, all of whose members were blood kin, initially took precedence over ties between communes. Rules of descent became necessary to distinguish between membership in the collective and in the commune, which was thereby transformed into a matrilineal (matrilateral) kingroup (*rod*).

Therefore, the formation of the first mode-of-production opened cracks in the total communism of the primitive commune, leading eventually to differentiation within it of family nuclei. At first wholly dependent on collective economic ties, these family nuclei, bonding an "alien" male with one or more females and their offspring, were a potential source of the dissolution of primitive communist relations. As the forces of production developed within them, the individual families became increasingly autonomous economically, giving rise to differences in their statuses. This process usually culminated in separation

of the "family-unilineal kingroup collective" into "extended family households" and a corresponding switch from matrilineal to patrilineal calculation of descent and inheritance [115].

Semënov's writings exemplify an approach to theory in which categories are totalized and invested with reality greater than the phenomena they classify. This is done in the name of the Dialectic: thus, the form is less "real" than the content hidden in it and appearances are but fleeting expressions of an essence. Generalizations from evidence become "natural historical laws," data are said to reveal their true nature (being). In sum, under the influence of doctrine, theory gets replaced by totalizing generalizations in the form of taxonomic hierarchies. Scientists, who object on theoretical grounds to the reification of taxonomic classifications, may be accused of "subjective idealism."

A factor that encouraged this tendency to reify categories was the previously mentioned abandonment of research on living cultures in favor of "historical reconstructions" of "earlier stages" in social development. Any society that was clearly "pre-class" had to be classified as "primitive communal," which in Soviet doctrine was identical with society organized into "unilineal kingroups" (*rodovoe obshchestvo*), and in each such society survivals of the "matrilineal stage" had to be discovered. In this way, doctrine severely biased fieldwork conducted in the late 1930s to the 1950s. At least one Siberian ethnographer, the late Glafira Vasilevich (a student of Shternberg), admitted in a work published posthumously that truth was willfully violated under the influence of doctrine [116]. The possibility that these survivals or "remnants" (*ostatki*) were in fact integral to the functioning of an existing social structure, contributing to the success of the activity whereby people ensured the system's replication in order to reproduce themselves, was excluded from consideration.

A revival of field ethnography began with the appointment of the Moscovite, Sergei Tolstov (1907–76), to head the Institute of Ethnography of the Academy of Sciences and to the Chair of Ethnography in the History Department of Moscow University in 1942 [117]. Trained in the Anuchin tradition, Tolstov was concurrently ethnographer, physical anthropologist and archaeologist. His principal scholarly contributions were to the "paleo-ethnographic" (his term) reconstruction of Central Asian history.

At first, the revival was limited mainly to ethnogeographical and ethnohistorical problems connected with determining the boundaries between ethnic groups and their origins. But beginning in the 1950s, more and more attention was focused on ethnic identity, both on how it is shaped and how it changes. Ethnographers became particularly interested in how specific ethnic groups and the peasantry adapted to Soviet conditions; this was destined to resurrect the cultural perspective.

The method of research that has scientists live among the people they study for lengthy periods, characteristic of social anthropology and early Soviet ethnography, was restored to prominence. But field ethnographers, of necessity concerned with the actual working of society, confront a problematic different from "historians of primordial society." What people do and why took precedence over "survivals" of "earlier stages" in evolution.

This has given rise to something like a theoretical vacuum, since an appropriate theory of culture had not been developed by Soviet ethnographers. The vacuum has been partially filled by a return to the conceptual frame inherited from traditional Russian ethnography, in which, as we wrote above, culture was primarily connected with ethnic identity: the characteristics whereby a people separate themselves collectively and are seen by others as different. While much more is at stake than "the creation of a single Soviet culture, Socialist in content, national in

form" (a thesis originated by Stalin), there is little doubt that this trend is connected with the development of nationalism among ethnic groups in the USSR, the Russians included.

Theoretically, the emphasis on the study of ethnic characteristics and processes is represented by Yu. Bromley, director of the Institute of Ethnography, S. Bruk and V. Kozlov [118]. It is also reflected in the recent strong interest in folkore studies.

The problem of "culture" is much more than one of ethnic identity. But the creation of a theory of culture is complicated by the ambivalence of the historical-evolutionist doctrine towards the conceptual basis of such a theory. Functional analyses revealing equivalence between behaviors that follows very different rules tend to undermine faith in evolutionist schema: one begins to wonder whether customs supposedly signalling a long-vanished stage might not be better interpreted as functional alternatives for realizing the activity sustaining and replicating an existing structure [119].

It is these more general problems of culture theory that the Armenian social philosopher, Eduard Markarian, has tackled in several book-length essays [120]. In them he advocates a tripartite division of research on human society: from the standpoint of social organization, or the structure of social relations; of cultural organization, or the functioning of such structures; and of the organization of the activity whereby people sustain and replicate their systems in particular geographical-historical environments. He attempts to define the relationship between "local cultures" or "civilizations," which are functionally equivalent, and socioeconomic formations conceived as levels in the historical development of culture, or the functioning of social structure at different levels in the development of human activity, and also between the origin of a human activity and the cultural mode in which it is expressed. He discusses the difficulty of differentiating "cultural" and "biological" in human evolution, and suggests criteria.

Markarian's essays are relevant to the concerns of non-Soviet sociocultural anthropologists and students of human evolution. Some Soviet ethnographers have tried to adopt his definition of culture for typologies of "historico-ethnographic (cultural) regions" and "economic-cultural types," as well as for the classification of "ethnic communities." But the broader implications of Markarian's work, especially for understanding the biological-ecologial underpinnings of cultural behavior, so far have made no impression.

THE STUDY OF KINSHIP

The concluding section examines an ongoing paradigm shift in the Soviet understanding of the organization and evolution of primitive society, both to illustrate how this is taking place and to demonstrate how the historical evolutionary perspective shapes the perceptions of Soviet ethnographers. The focus is on kinship, because its study has presented the most serious challenge to doctrine. This has occurred for several reasons, not necessarily connected to the intrinsic worth of the subject.

First, there is the relative sophistication in methods of analysis required, coupled with the necessity to be thoroughly versed in the data of Western anthropology, which means being able to read Western languages. Just as mainstream British and especially, U.S. anthropologists are generally ignorant of non-Western (indeed, non-English language) sources on their subjects, so mainstream Soviet ethnographers tend to be unacquainted with the methods and data of Western anthropology.

Second, the most obvious factual errors in the evolutionary schema of Morgan and Engels were in the realm of kinship. The extent to which these errors had become incorporated into doctrine necessitated doctrinal revision. Such was the case with the so-

called "consanguine" and "Punaluan families." founded partially on the mistaken interpretation of Hawaiian kinship.

Third, and perhaps most important in the context of Soviet doctrine, the study of kinship has revealed flaws in the conceptualization of the relations of production of pre-class societies. The debate ocassioned by acquaintance with recent studies of gathering-hunting societies in Africa, Australia, South America and the Arctic has been waged in the peculiar idiom of Soviet doctrine, which interprets the "base/superstructure" dichotomy to mean that relations of production must be distinguished from relations for kinship. The work by several Soviet ethnographers on the way kinship intersects age and sex divisions suggests that assumptions underlying all positions in these discussions are wrong, implying the debates have been largely irrelevant.

In order to understand the peculiar significance attached by Soviet theory to Australian Aboriginal kinship and to the order in which kinship systems evolved, a brief introduction to this "base/superstructure" issue as it relates to the unilineal kingroup (*rod*) and commune (*obshchina*) concepts is helpful. Interest in the Australian Aborigines was dictated by the presumed stadial position of their society as one just emerging from "group marriage" without unilineal kingroups (*dorodovoe obshchestvo*), and therefore truly primordial. The apparent dichotomy between "local group" ("horde") and "totemic clan" among Australians was interpreted at first to mean they were in fact separate entities, the first an economic collective and the second, a superstructural entity of "blood kin," which as the result of exogamy and patrilocal residence did not coincide with the "horde." On the basis of Morgan's thesis, Australian kinship terminology bespoke of a previous condition in which groups of siblings had actually married, it was deduced that at one time "horde" and "clan" had coincided, in which case individuals would not have left their mothers' group when they married.

Therefore, the order in which kinship systems evolved was tied to the issue of the transformation of the "consanguineal commune" into a "unilineal kingroup" (*rod*), and the development of the latter into a superstructural "clan." According to this scheme, marriage residence in the unilineal kingroup was originally matrilocal, because this preserved the integrity of the *rod* composed of "blood relatives" and, therefore, coincided with economic and kinship collectives. Transition to patrilocal residence, as in Australia, disrupted this unity, leading to eventual shift from matri- to patrilineal filiation and breakdown of the collective through internal differentiation of economically autonomous pair-bonded families as a result of a switch from group to individual marriage.

This meant that systems like the Australian, which seemed to exhibit elements of both patrilineal and matrilineal kinship, were in transition. How the presumed primordial status of Australian Aboriginal society could be harmonized with transition to a "higher condition" was never satisfactorily resolved. Given this scheme, it is nearly impossible to distinguish theoretically between lineal descent groups and kindreds based on a different principle.

During the 1930s it was argued that, in so far as ownership of land and resources – the principal means of production – was concentrated in the matrilineal kingroup, production relations initially took the form of relations by blood, and the matrilineal kingroup (*rod*) was in essence an economic collective. Production relations were differentiated from kinship by the degree to which social divisions of labor developed and individual families became economically viable. Unilineal kingroup collectives were finally transformed into purely superstructural clans, when ownership of the principal means of production became concentrated in households, and was passed from father to son. Thus, transition from matri- to patrilineal norms marked the beginning of the dissolution of the uni-

lineal kingroup system and emergence of the first elements of class society.

The challenges to this scheme in the 1960s and early 1970s did not generally abandon the assumption of a base/superstructure dialectic analogous to that in class society, but reinterpreted it. One group (Bakhta, Ter-Akopian) argued that kinship relations organized reproduction only, not production, even when they gave their form to economic relations, and were in fact in dialectical opposition to production relations organizing the local group. This yielded such a strict biological definition of kinship ties that Bakhta and Seniuta termed them "carnal relations." Ter-Akopian thought that all relations of early society were enveloped in the kinship *form*, because reproduction of a population was more immediately important to survival and growth than production of means of production, which was too technologically undeveloped and ecologically dependent to be differentiated [121].

A feature of Soviet doctrine is the tendency to absolutize Marx's analytical categories, such as the "base/superstructure dialectic," "modes-of-production," "socioeconomic formations," into immutable principles. This done, it becomes necessary to "discover" institutions embodying these principles.

Thus it happened that, during the creation of the "five-stage" progression from primitive communalism to communism (which to be wholly "dialectical," should be three stages: primitive communalism, negated by class society, the negation of the negation of which is communism), the *principle* of "relations of production" were embodied in the *institution* of "property." As a result, the five principal "modes-of-production" underlying the five canonical "socioeconomic formations" were defined, not on the basis of the structure of production relations, functioning in various relations of property as well as in other ways, but on the basis of a typology of property [122].

In the case of the "Primitive Communal Formation," collective ownership of the principal means of production was the defining characteristic. Therefore, a "collective" had to exist as the subject of ownership. The possibility that no such "institution" existed was not theoretically conceivable.

However, in so far as the "production relations" of gathering-hunting societies constitute individual relations for survival and reproduction in particular ecological conditions with an ecologically specific set of techniques and skills mediated by a very simple and multifunctional technology, "property" varies according to circumstances. Hence, it is impossible to differentiate a particular collective "subject of ownership." This in turn implies that the "base/superstructure" dichotomy is essentially meaningless. Kinship is merely the language of relations, not a particular "institution" coexisting with another "institution," the commune, as subject of ownership of the means of production.

Therefore, the most striking feature of the orthodox Soviet theoretical framework was its manipulation of abstract principles of social organization embodied in ideal types. These types were based on generalizations of particular social institutions, which were viewed entirely apart from their functions within any real social structure. In this way, a theoretical elaboration of social structure through analysis of its functioning in different societies with the same level of development of the forces of production, was replaced by metaphysical speculations about nonexistent institutions.

This was, of course, incompatible with the view of the "socioeconomic formation," widely accepted among Western Marxists, as a unity of several subsystems functionally limiting each other [123]. In particular, this intersystemic functional compatability is dealt with in the "law of correspondence," covering the logical ascension from the form (structure) to the content (functions).

Initially, the study of kinship in Soviet ethnography was incidental to the larger debate about the economic structure of primitive society and attempts to apply the "base/superstructure" scheme to its institutions. Kinship was not an independent object of research, and was used very selectively to substantiate various theories. The emergence of the fundamentalist scheme of group marriage–matrilineal kingroup–patrilineal kingroup (family) was not based on the concrete study of kinship terminology, but rather on the use of Engels to validate Morgan's scheme. As mentioned above, it was taken for granted that if a given society showed instances of both matri- and patrilineal groups, or double descent, it was the result of its transition from the matrilineal to the patrilineal kingroup, a view shared by Sir James Frazer. This remains the fundamentalist position today, proclaimed by Petrova-Averkieva at Burg Wartenstein in 1976 [124]. It is reiterated by A. Pershits, L. Fainberg, and many others.

Evolution of family and marriage norms is a realm of theory that has become heavily ideological. This is probably the source of the greates disagreement between Soviet and Western anthropologists. Often both are dogmatic in their assertions.

The interest in kinship as an independent object of inquiry began in Soviet ethnography under the influence of new data developed in Western anthropology that made many of Morgan's views seem questionable. Later data on kinship were used to attack the orthodox position. Ethnographers who specialized in areas outside the Soviet Union led the incorporation of this data into theory. Familiar with Western languages and theories, they put the study of primitive society on a less ideological footing.

The standard Soviet position maintained that original promiscuity and/or group marriage were universal in pre-unilineal kingroup (*dorodovoe*) society. While a continuation of the earlier speculation of McLennan, Bachofen, Frazer, and Rivers, it reflected Morgan's understanding of kinship terms as the record of earlier forms of marriage. The tradition following Morgan was not exclusively Soviet: most older Western theorists viewed kinship essentially in the same way (e.g., Rivers, Kohler, Sapir, Gifford). The Soviet position was also based on acceptance of Morgan's erroneous placing of the Hawaiian (generational) pattern of kinship nomenclature in the very beginning of evolution, since it appeared to be the simplest. Morgan mistakenly thought the Polynesians to be on a very low level of cultural development and therefore deduced that their social organization too must be the most primitive.

Morgan's theory was rejected by W.H.R. Rivers, who in 1914 identified the bifurcate-merging terminologies as evolutionarily preceding the generational pattern [125]. His argument, however, was also based on the idea that kinship terms reflected the previous forms of marriage. He believed that bifurcate-merging terminologies resulted from the practice of cross-cousin marriage, an idea that originated with Tylor.

In Soviet literature, the first criticism of Morgan did not appear until 1940 [126]. Its author, A. Zolotarëv, was certainly influenced by Rivers. Like Rivers, he believed that the dual organization (which was the main subject of Zolotarëv's work) resulted from the intermarriage of two previously unrelated groups of kin. Zolotarëv used an impressive body of data on the incidence of various forms of social dualism, but the theoretical part of his work fell short of Rivers'. The reasons for transformation of the "primeval human herd" into the dual organization remained unclear. Following Rivers, Zolotarëv stressed bilateral cross-cousin marriage as the cause of bifurcate-merging terminologies, and like Rivers, he tried to explain the whole of social organization by recourse to the forms of marriage. Zolatarëv's work, which reads like an appendix to Rivers' *Social Organization*, re-

mains influential and, through it, Rivers' impact on the Soviet approach to kinship (which, unlike Morgan's, is not readily acknowledged) continues. Although Zolotarëv's attention to the dual organization indirectly criticized Morgan's "Hawaiian" theory, the definitive Soviet rejection of Morgan's error was made by D.A. Olderogge in 1951 [127].

The idea of the universal character of the matrilineal kingroup has survived, although the study of kinship has provided new ammunition against it. Aware of the criticism, the fundamentalists have been forced to look for new arguments in its favor. The most unorthodox defense was provided by Yu. Semënov. The other either tried (unsuccessfully) to force the ideological issue, an ideological cornerstone of the "Soviet Marxist" position (Averkieva), or ended up with a completely eclectic defense using absolutely all the arguments that have been advanced in its favor (Pershits, Fainberg, Turmarkin). L. Fainberg, for example, tries to interpret Murdock as having conceded that matrilineal societies are more archaic than patrilineal [128], although the latter denied the value of descent for evolutionary reconstructions. Murdock's statistical method was justly criticized in the Soviet Union as mechanical. Ironically, Fainberg reverts to the same approach, maintaining that most hunters and gatherers in South America are matrilineal (which in itself is questionable), an argument that can be easily countered by reference to many other hunter-gatherer societies that are patrilineal. In any case, most of them have bifurcate-merging terminologies that are essentially bilateral. Fainberg even resorts to data on troops of apes for evidence in favor of primordial matriliny. He is undaunted by the evolutionary gap between the ape troop and the hunting tribes of South America. Here is his conclusion [129]:

> Thanks to the existence within them of *de facto* calculation of kinship through the mothers, the close and stable relationship between offspring of the same mother preserved throughout life, and the tendency to exogamy that makes its appearance in some of them, troops with a dominance hierarchy exhibited from the beginning a tendency to turn into a kingroup based on matrilineal (never patrilineal) filiation. In so far as exogamy facilitated establishing and maintaining economic and other relations with neighboring herds as well as contributing to the superior physical development of members of those herds in which exogamous marriages predominated, it may be supposed that this initially biological tendency was reinforced in the primeval human herd.

The fundamentalists' arsenal of arguments ranges from upholding the biological foundations of exogamy in the manner of Morgan, Frazer (and P.P. Efimenko in the 1930s [130]), to pointing out its cultural advantages and making incomplete and selective use of data on South American hunting and gathering societies. It is obviously an eclectic attempt to defend the matrilineal theory at all cost, rather than to test it in light of new facts. Enforced uniformity of theory could be a powerful tool in maintaining the authority and privileges of the ethnographic establishment as guardians of the true doctrine. The times, however, have changed.

The evolutionary universality of the matrilineal kingroup has been questioned by several Soviet ethnographers, coming from a variety of theoretical perspectives. One of them is a well-known specialist on Australian Aborigines, V.R. Kabo. He generally supports the commune as the basic socioeconomic unit in primitive societies, a legacy of the fundamentalist framework. On the other hand, he notes that matri- and patrilineal groups were equally widespread among hunters and gatherers. In his opinion, such groups simply had different functions, and thus cannot be put in an evolutionary sequence. He also points out that bands of primitive foragers are usually patrilocal, which does not support the notion they were matrilineal [131]. His position is similar to, but not identical with, that of Julian Steward, or Elman Service [132].

Generally speaking, in the West most anthropologists abandoned long ago the idea

that matri- and patrilineal societies represent stages of evolution. Social change cannot be measured in terms of uniform changes in forms of kinship, much less of descent rules, which are the result of many factors. This position of Murdock [133] gained wide acceptance. Murdock, however, violated his own principles when, like Morgan, he came to the conclusion that the Hawaiian (generational) pattern of kinship nomenclature was the earliest in the evolutionary sense.

The evolutionary camp in the United States was rather puzzled by the lack of obvious connection between social evolution and corresponding types of kinship. For example, Leslie White felt that there was something wrong with our understanding of kinship, not with the theory of evolution [134].

It may be said that in one respect the approach to kinship in the West and in the Soviet Union is similar. Both essentially go back to Morgan and the idea that kinship terms are "social." Western anthropology knows another tradition going back to Kroeber, who stressed their psychological character. This view never gained supporters in the Soviet Union, and in its extreme form was also rejected in the West.

As mentioned above, prior to the 1950s, the study of kinship as an independent object of research was overshadowed by the "larger" theory of primitive communalism and a peculiar philosophical kingroup/commune dichotomy which precluded the incorporation of kinship-related data into theory. An exception to the rule was a work by one of the deans of modern Soviet ethnography, S.A. Tokarev, a prolific writer on topics ranging from the history of ethnographic thought in Russia to Russian material culture, Australian kinship to history of religion. He is extremely well read and probably knows more about various fields in anthropology than anyone else in the Soviet Union today.

In his early study of Australian systems [135], he expressed that the historically heterogeneous characteristic meanings of kinship terms may signify that the various groups of terms appeared at various stages of the formation of the system as it exists today. That was a deviation from Morgan's position, that they pertained *en toto* to a preceding stage of evolution. Tokarev, unlike Morgan, did not consider that kinship reflected only previous forms of marriage. He originated the idea, later elaborated by the modern theorist, Mikhail Kriukov, that the bifurcate-merging systems of the "Australian" type, i.e., those characterized by a dual division of terms, represented the earliest stage in kinship evolution [136]. Tokarev's paper was ahead of its time by several decades. But after the establishment of orthodox Soviet theory, Tokarev did not publish anything on the subject of kinship for almost three decades.

Some work on kinship was also done by L. Shternberg [137], one of the fathers of Soviet ethnography, the author of a classic study of a "Gens-Triplex" marriage alliance ("The Gilyak Phratry") in Northeastern Siberia. Later, the same type of organization was reported in Southeast Asia.

But the first steps in the critical use of kinship to reexamine some of the standard fundamentalist positions were made in the 1950s. The publication of the collection of theoretical essays entitled, "Unilineal Kinship Society" (*Rodovoe obshchestvo*), in 1951 presents an interesting example of that process [138]. Although this was prior to Stalin's death, it already contained some elements of the revision. Most authors still used the method of "survivals" and selectively quoted the ethnographic record to substantiate such standard positions as the evolutionary priority of matriarchy, or the lack of private property in primitive societies. These ideas were presented in the usual stilted "philosophical" language in which ideological truths are conveyed, with denunciations of British functionalism, the *Kulturkreise* of Graebner and Schmidt, the ideas of diffusion

and migration, and "bourgeois" science in general.

The most uncomprising defense of the orthodox view was provided by Mark Kosven. To him, the universality of matriarchy was synonymous with the idea of general evolution. He condemned even those who saw this evolution as mere transition from matrilineal to patrilineal descent; the importance of matriarchy lay in its being a specific social order based on the superior position of women. He accused the "bourgeois" scientists of purposeful and ideologically motivated distortion of evolution. Matriarchy to him was an article of faith by which the true ideological colors of theory should be judged [139]:

> It is precisely because the particular process of transition from matriarchy to patriarchy we have delineated... demonstrates so clearly the global character of the development of the primitive-communal system, the universality of matriarchy and its replacement by patriarchy, that both this process and its forms are totally ignored by bourgeois science.

What Kosven really meant was that without transition from matriarchy to patriarchy, the whole theory of social evolution would lose its deterministic and universalist character. The consequences for offical doctrine were quite clear.

But along with the orthodox views, the book also contained the repudiation of Morgan's placement of the Hawaiian system of kinship at the beginning of evolution. The belated "obituary" was elegantly written by D.A. Olderogge who later became possibly the most influential Soviet theorist of kinship. Olderogge was critical of the Hawaiian theory long before the 1950s, but a full-scale demolition was not possible earlier. One has to understand that the early 1950s were not a time of ideological "thaw." Anyone chipping away at the theoretical orthodoxy had to tap very lightly.

Olderogge analyzed the Polynesian, African and Northeast Asian data on the Hawaiian system, as well as the generational features of Chinese nomenclature. His conclusion was that the "Malayan" pattern (the term he used, following Morgan) appeared parallel to the development of the extended family and class society. Olderogge rejected attempts of earlier Soviet students of the Chukchee and Yukaghir of northeast Siberia to "reconstruct" matrilineal lineages in their past. He supported Shternberg's opinion that generational features in those systems appeared on the basis of a preceding "Turano-Ganowanian" system.

Olderogge was the first Soviet ethnographer to decisively break with the Morgan–Rivers tradition which viewed kinship nomenclatures as the renmants of extinct forms of marriage. Our impression is that he was partially influenced by Lowie and Radcliffe-Brown, although he certainly could not quote them in this paper. Unlike them, however, he strongly argued in favor of correspondence between the evolution of kinship systems and other apsects of social organization, writing that "the system of kinship conforms to the changes in social organization quite closely" [140].

This was another departure from Morgan, who had viewed kinship terms as conservative and reflecting a more ancient social order. Olderogge pointed out that Soviet scholars had erroneously used the concepts of consanguine family and the Malayan pattern of kinship nomenclature as if they were synonymous. He was careful not to criticize the former, since it was then considered to be a cornerstone of the "primitive herd" theory [141], and generally made his paper look like a purely "technical" correction, without far-reaching implications for the general theory of social evolution. But to a perceptive reader the thrust of his approach was clear. It was a rebuttal to such stalwarts of orthodoxy as P. Boriskovsky and M. Kosven. And it was done on a level of competency in kinship studies that the opposition could not ap-

proach. Olderogge avoided mentioning any names and only said, "some try to defend literally every one of Morgan's ideas by repeating opinions expressed 80–90 years ago" [142].

Olderogge also must be credited with the introduction of kinship as a specific area of study in Soviet ethnography, an area that required special training and competency, and one in which the fundamentalist position was the weakest. Like Tokarev, Olderogge was extremely well read in general ethnographic theory. With this classical education, razor-sharp wit and encyclopedic competency in several key areas ranging from ancient history to linguistics to material culture, Olderogge belonged to the "old school" of the Russian intelligentsia [143].

N. Butinov, author of a paper on exogamy based on Australian data published in the collection, joined Olderogge in rejecting the Malayan hypothesis, although he did not provide a specific argument. In addressing his main topic, Butinov first criticized the idea that the monogamous family, with its elementary terms, was an appropriate starting point for development of the concept of kinship. In accordance with the fundamentalist view, he acknowledged the initial stage of promiscuity. In Butinov's opinion, exogamy was the means whereby possible disruption of the group by competition among the males was suppressed. He followed the nineteenth century notion that exogamy was "invented" in order to achieve some positive social results.

This line was a continuation of speculation in the Soviet Union during the 1930s and 1940s by Efimenko, Tolstov and Zolotarëv. Although rejecting the individual family as the starting point in social evolution, Butinov believed like his predecessors that the initial social organism (*rod*) was made up of biological relatives. According to this view, the economic unit originally must have been synonymous with the group of kin. Butinov concluded that, since the economic unit was more important than marriage links, logic dictates that marriage was dislocal [144].

The "dislocal marriage" thesis has practically no foundation in the ethnographic record. Based on the understanding of kinship as originally wholly biological, it depends on playing a logical game with an abstract "economic unit" comprising genetically related individuals, which logically excludes affines. Butinov simply repeated Tolstov's earlier view [145]. The "dislocal marriage" hypothesis later became the foundation of Yuri Semënov's unorthodox defense of fundamentalism described earlier. Butinov himself later switched to McLennan's theory that exogamy originated in bride capture [146].

On the positive side, it must be said that Butinov recognized the terminological unity of alternate generations in Australian marriage sections, without construing it as evidence for anomalous forms of marriage, and suggested that in the past marriage sections were preceded by a pattern based on relative age/sex differentiation. He criticized Radcliffe-Brown's genealogical interpretation of Australian kinship, but also suggested evidence for a "matrilineal stage" among the Aranda and other groups with four marriage sections. This deduction appears unwarranted, since the system of four sections does not require unilateral descent. Butinov got himself into a logical fix when he tried to substantiate both the dislocal marriage and the matrilineal theory on Australian data.

The next step in the study of kinship was made by Yu. Likhtenberg in 1960 [147]. Her work, like Olderogge's, was done on a highly professional level, indicating, among other things, her familiarity with contemporary Western theories of kinship. Likhtenberg criticized Morgan for his theory of the family and group marriage and his understanding of kinship as evidence of preceding forms of marriage. She noted that Morgan's followers, such as J. Kohler and W.H.R. Rivers, carried his theory to absurdity. For example, use of

the same terms for grandfather and husband, or grandmother and wife (the unity of alternate generations), was interpreted as "proof" for the occurrence of the most unlikely forms of marriage. She allied herself with Tokarev's view that Australian terms of kinship originally applied to groups, not individuals.

In Soviet ethnography, Tokarev was the first to point out a correlation between the system of kinship and marriage sections in Australia. He concluded [148], "If one looks closely at the kinship terminology of a particular tribe as a whole, we can see that it is well suited to a system of four or eight sections co-existing with the generational division." A similar opinion was expressed by A.K. Romney and E.J. Epling [149], who viewed marriage sections and kinship terminology as two aspects of the same social organization.

But Tokarev's observations that the dual division of terms connected to the unity of alternate generations did not explain why, within each half of the dual division, kin are grouped under one term. Likhtenberg set out to prove that the division of Australian society into marriage sections is connected to an obligatory form of marriage. The term "epygamy" was not yet used in Soviet ethnography (it was introduced by Olderogge in 1978), but in essence that was what Likhtenberg had in mind. She started her analysis by comparing the Australian data with the Siberian Gilyak system described by Shternberg and found a common pattern. The Gilyak system was based on the following:

1. Prohibition of marriage between generations;
2. Existence of group terms in their kinship terminology;
3. Existence in the past of a mandatory form of marriage;
4. Kinship terminology engendered by a mandatory form of marriage.

When Radcliffe-Brown described the obligatory forms of marriage in Australia and the types of kinship systems that correspond to them, he concluded that the relationship was purely functional, and rejected the idea that kinship terminology may be a holdover of a different form of social organization [150]. Opposing that view, Likhtenberg used data primarily on the Yaralde to demonstrate that Shternberg's rules apply even in a situation where there seemingly exists a contradiction between the system of kinship and the marriage rules (in the Yaralde case the contradiction appeard to be most glaring).

Likhtenberg hypothesized that sets of marriage rules, rules of descent, and marriage residence would generate particular types of terminological kin grouping. The rest of her paper was essentially a set of tables, showing what would happen if matrilineal sections were supplemented by patrilineal subsections (which in her opinion emerged later, with the transition to patrilocal marriage). It seems that reference to originally matrilineal sections was probably a concession to the orthodox views. From her tables it is obvious that the alleged historical sequence, matrilocality to patrilocality, is unimportant for her main conclusions. Her case is based on the simultaneous existence of both types of descent. Actually, "descent" does not seem an appropriate term since the terms repeat themselves every two or four generations (depending on the number of sections). Thus, there is no continuous "line" of descent, but the alternation of terms.

By grouping the terms according to the hypothetical rules that generated them, Likhtenberg convincingly demonstrated that the contradiction between the existing marriage rules and the egocentric system of kinship "exists" only in the mind of an anthropoligist, who views the terms individually. Practically all the terms in the Yaralde nomenclature fell into the categories derived

from the generative rules. Likhtenberg's scheme produced terms covering groups of relatives; thus her analysis was not only powerful, but very elegant, and her method was totally without precedent in Soviet literature. It is similar to the generative rules and componential analysis technique developed in Western anthropology (e.g., F.G. Lounsbury's work on Latin kinship).

Likhtenberg's second paper, published in the same collection, demonstrated that the same principles of analysis could be successfully applied to other kinship terminologies in Australia and Melanesia. Here are some of her conclusions [151]:

> Thus, the study of Australian and Melanesian systems of kinship demonstrates that group terms in the Turano-Ganowánian systems [Morgan's term sometimes used in Soviet literature for the "classificatory" systems] reflect the grouping of relatives into marriage sections... Kinship terms originally stood for the relations between groups, not between individuals, and for that reason they cannot be used as means to determine the actual form of family, but only to delineate groups between whose members marriages were arranged, or were possible.

Likhtenberg demonstrated the functional link in Australia between marriage sections and the bifurcate-merging systems of kinship, and suggested that sectional systems once were widespread, if not universal. She was unfamiliar with the data on the !Kung Bushmen, where fictive kinship established through "name relationships" can be equated to a system of marriage sections. This is quite clear from Lorna Marshall's description [152], although she herself did not come to this conclusion. More recently, a section system was described among the Bantu in Central Africa [153].

Later, the structural link between bifurcate-merging systems and the system of four marriage classes was stressed by V.M. Misiugin [154]. He stressed the lack of lineal descent in Australia (unlike Likhtenberg, who still used the terms "matrilineal sections" and "patrilineal subsections"), and proposed that the system with four exogamous sections divided into two local groups is the "simplest social structure regulating the life and productive activity of the collective (tribe) that owns its territory in common" [155]. It is interesting to note that Misiugin called this initial stage "the unilineal kingroup (*rodovaîa*) social organization," although according to him there did not exist any unilateral or unilineal groups. He used that term following the above described Soviet tradition of equating a truly primitive society with the *rod*. The force of tradition is truly amazing, especially given the fact that Misiugin's analysis is quite unconventional.

Likhtenberg's attack on the use of kinship data to reconstruct the past forms of family was supported by Olderogge, who stressed the social and legal aspects of kinship terminology in his discussion of the traditional social organization of the Bakongo in Central Africa [156]. Based on the analysis of concrete kinship systems, and not on speculation about "origins," the work of these two scientists denied by implication the fundamentalist use of "survivals." They not only reintroduced kinship into Soviet ethnography as an object of study in itself rather than as an appendage to a preconceived social theory, but gained substantial freedom in that field by the sophistication of their analysis. The fundamentalists simply did not speak the new language well enough to provide serious opposition, although they continue to hold the top positions and write the *grundliegende Werke* on general theory.

But the consensus is moving towards Olderogge's thesis that kinship expresses very different types of relationships and, therefore, is more complex than previously thought. It is also generally agreed that a correlation exists between socioeconomic arrangements and certain features of kinship systems. Olderogge came very close to saying that kinship was a particular language in which the socioeconomic relations of primitive society (and

changes in them) were expressed. When we sufficiently understand the meaning of its elements, it would be possible to use kinship for evolutionary typologies. He was very careful in his own historical reconstructions, and no less disdainful of "conjectural history" than, for example, Radcliffe-Brown would have been.

The new freedom in the study of kinship was only one of the symptoms of the growing boldness on the anti-fundamentalist trend. In the 1960s it was gaining momentum in all social sciences. The historians led the way with their attack on the five-stage scheme of socioeconomic formations mentioned earlier.

In the 1970s, the interest in kinship and its evolution grew and produced important results. There seems to be some parallel in the study of kinship in the Soviet Union and the West. The technique of analysis was perfected mostly in the West (various forms of componential analysis), although Soviet scholars also did work on formalization of the descriptive language of kinship [157]. The evolution of particular nomenclatures was reconstructed, both in the West and the East (the Black Carib, Latin, Russian, Polish). Especially important with respect to evolution of kinship systems were the works of Gertrude Dole and Frank Lounsbury in the USA, and Mikhail Kriukov and Nikolai Girenko in the USSR.

Kriukov's book [158] was the first fundamental Soviet study of a particular kinship system. It was both a general theoretical work and a reconstruction of the evolution of Chinese kinship. This reconstruction by itself is of considerable theoretical importance, because it is the only case at our disposal where data on structural changes in a single system over a span of about 3,000 years are available. Kriukov's study demonstrated that the Chinese system evolved from the bifurcate-merging pattern of the "Australian" type (with the dual division of terms) into a bifurcate-merging type close to the Iroquois pattern, from which developed a bifurcate-collateral pattern.

Apart from the painstaking reconstruction of the historical changes in the Chinese system, Kriukov constructed a new evolutionary typology of kinship nomenclatures, represented in Fig. 1.

In this scheme [159], Kriukov used the logically consistent types elucidated by Lowie, which are based on the combination of two principles: bifurcation and merging. Lowie himself, as Kriukov argued, had erroneously assumed the evolutionary priority of the bifurcate-collateral pattern.

Kriukov's view of evolution was based partially on data about the historical changes of several known kinship patterns, and partially on the work of Gertrude Dole, who had conducted an extensive theoretical investigation of the evolution of kinship [160]. Kriukov and Dole agree that most systems move from type I to type III, and then to type IV, while the generational pattern is a special case. Kriukov goes much further in his general approach to kinship's links to other parts of social organization than Dole, whose search for correlation between kinship and social organization at large is somewhat sporadic. Nonetheless, she says in her later work that, "It seems clear that lineage nomen-



Fig. 1.

clature is correlated with a particular level of social development" [161]. She also sees the inheritance of property as a reason for the emergence of the lineage pattern [162].

Both Dole [163] and Olderogge [164] view the generational pattern as a result of disruption of social organization, although Olderogge also credits it to the development of a corporate patriarchal family. Dole's major concern was with the transformation of patterns of kinship nomenclature from one type to another, where she demonstrated the development of the generational pattern from the bifurcate merging one. The intermediate stage she called "bifurcate generational" [165].

Kriukov disagreed with Dole's placing of the so-called "primitive isolating" pattern prior to the bifurcate-merging in the evolutionary scale, although he did not provide specific argument against it. Apparently, he objected because the primitive isolating pattern terminologically separates the nuclear family from the rest of the relatives, who are differentiated only by generation and sex. Placing this pattern at the beginning of evolution would lead one to a conclusion that initially the terms of kinship were individual, not group, and hence, that the relationships obtaining within the nucelar family became the basis of the future evolution of kinship "by extension," two points which are rejected by practically all Soviet theorists. Likewise, Dole did not provide any argument in favor of her hypothesis. It remains unclear what mechanism accounts for the transformation of the "primitive-isolating" into the bifurcate-merging pattern.

Kriukov's general scheme of evolution of patterns of kinship nomenclature places the whole question of social evolution of pre-class and early class societies on a different footing. The Soviet sociological approach to kinship, which he exemplifies, finally produced a solidly substantiated general evolutionary typology. It synthesies the best work on this topic done both in the West and in the Soviet Union. Kriukov convincingly demonstrated the importance of kinship studies for historical reconstructions, and, in this respect, followed in Olderogge's and Likhtenberg's footsteps, approaching kinship as a historical source, and refusing to see in it primarily a reflection of extinct forms of marriage, or to ascribe the formation of kinship terminology to any single factor. His understanding of the meaning of kinship terms is essentially the same as Olderogge's or Service's, that is, as a type of status terminology [166].

The language of Kriukov's study, like that of his unorthodox Soviet predecessors, is free of speculation about the "primeval human herd," "matriarchy," and other fundamentalist concepts. His book also contains criticism of major approaches to kinship, especially of Morgan, Lowie, and Murdock, which are made in the language of science, not ideology [167].

The work of Nikolai Girenko [168], exemplifies the Soviet sociological approach to social evolution. The significance of his contribution is twofold. First, he used the kinship system of the Wanyamwezi (and related groups) in East and Central Africa as an *historical source* for reconstructing their social evolution. This was a step forward from the position of Kriukov, who had a multitude of written sources for his reconstruction. Second (and this provided the theoretical foundation for the reconstruction), he developed a new approach to the *meaning* of kinship terminology.

Girenko's understanding of the latter is probably the most elaborate and rigorous in Soviet ethnography today. Girenko concentrated his attention not so much on the type of kinship nomenclature (as Kriukov had done), as on the group covered by kinship terminology, which he called the social organism of kinship. He sees this group as existing and evolving in three major dimensions simultaneously. First, it is characterized

by an organization of subsistence activity, referring primarily to the division of labor and patterns of consumption within the group, which is determined by the individual's position in the kinship structure. Second, there is the genealogical aspect of activity within the group, that is, the rules of its biological reproduction. Third, there is the relative status of groups of kin (and individuals) determined by the change of their position within the social organism of kinship, as their relative age and position in their generation change [169]. The relative kinship status appears to be a function primarily of the person's age and sex, and the place of his/her generation in the whole social organism of kinship.

Girenko does not attempt to find a special category of relations of production distinct from relations perceived as kin-based (or, rather, which are expressed by kinship), characteristic of the fundamentalist approach. Neither the kingroup/clan, nor the commune/band are the subject of these relations. Kinship encompasses the whole of society, and is *the system of expression* (we would say, the language) of all the most important relations in primitive society. This approach does away with the whole *rod/obshchina* dispute mentioned earlier and the search for primitive institutions corresponding to the base/superstructure dichotomy.

With a characteristic caution, Girenko did not say this directly, but the absence of the fundamentalist categories in his theory is conspicuous. He certainly does not separate the economic "relations of production" from the rules of biological reproduction of people, as the orthodox Soviet tradition would dictate. Both of these aspects are present in the activity of the social organism of kinship. Girenko did not specifically address the more philosophical issue of how to reconcile the *dominant* role of kinship in primitive society, and the *determinant* role of relations of production in the last instance, probably because he did not want to get into an ideological dispute with the fundamentalists. It seems, however, that his approach is in this aspect quite similar to Godelier, who says [170]:

> In an archaic society kinship relations *function* as relations of production, just as they function as political relations. To use Marx's vocabulary, kinship relations are here *both* infrastructure and superstructure... To the extent that kinship in this kind of society really functions as relations of productions, the determinant role of the economy does not contradict the dominant role of kinship, but is expressed through it.

The only possible disagreement between Godelier and Girenko would be that the latter does not see the relations of production in primitive society as economic. They are material relations of reproduction of the conditions of life, including the reproduction of human beings (the "genealogical aspect" in Girenko's terminology).

While we have been trying to "extract" the philosophical content from Girenko's work, he himself was more concerned with a more mundane (and more ethnographic) task of reconstructing the historical change in the Wanyamwezi social organization based on his new conception of kinship, which allowed him to use kinship nomenclature as an *historical source*, reflecting the fundamental patterns of social change. In other words, he says that by analyzing the reflection of social evolution in the language of kinship we can better comprehend its general character.

The Wanyamwezi case presents a perfect vehicle for testing Girenko's methodology. Their kinship terminology is well described, starting with the work of the nineteenth century German missionaries. Girenko's knowledge of the Bantu languages and wide application of the comparative method to other groups in East and Central Africa help him to make a strong case.

As we have noted above, Girenko has carried the thesis of the social meaning of kinship, and its link to the rest of the social organization as a whole, much further than

any of his Soviet predecessors. He took Tokarev's thesis of historical heterogeneity of kinship systems as one of the starting points in his approach to the evolution of kinship. This principle states that the same term (and the relationship that it stands for) may be 'rethought" and used in a new context, reflecting social change. The decisive influence is that change will come from one of the three aspects in which the social organism of kinship exists.

Girenko sees the general evolution of the social organism of kinship in the direction of greater and greater contraction, from the "Australian" pole, where practically all persons in a face-to-face situation are designated as relatives, to the modern English usage (the modern isolating pattern), where the range of kinship is narrow and quite distinct from other types of status terminology, such as economic or political. According to Girenko, the most conservative type of relationship within the system is the relationship in the main kinship unit – a group of siblings. The importance of that group was stressed by Radcliffe-Brown as a chief principle of bifurcate-merging terminologies [171]; but, contrary to Radcliffe-Brown, Girenko does not see the formation of the group of siblings as a result of extension of norms present in the nuclear family [172]:

> If one accepts the idea that evolution of kinship systems leads to the contraction of the social organism of kinship... it becomes obvious that the relationship between the "group of parents" and the "group of children" cannot be some extension of the operation of behavioral norms from the "nuclear family" to a larger group... It would be more accurate to say that the so-called "nuclear family" in this case is of less social importance for an individual than his/her membership in a larger group, that is, the group of siblings, who themselves are the offspring of similar groups.

Girenko differentiates between the terminology of kinship as a linguistic phenomenon (which is relatively conservative), and the system of kinship relationships, which is a social phenomenon. He says [173]:

> At any given moment the system of kinship terms reflects real relationships, links within the social organism of kinship. But it does this by way of social terms, that emerged at the preceding stages of social development. The new elements in terminology apparently originate, when the old terms are impossible to use, or they are insufficient.

Therefore, Girenko argues, whole groups of terms (and corresponding types of relationships) within a system may be hypothesized as originating at various stages of its formation.

Like Olderogge, Kriukov, Kabo, and other non-fundamentalist, Girenko rejected patri- or matrilineality as a basis for the evolutionary typology of kinship nomenclatures. In his reconstruction of Wanyamwezi social evolution, he made a convincing case that the unilateral social organisms of kinship had emerged among them on the basis of a bilateral group only at the last stage, and partially under the influence of their intense contact with the outside world during the height of long-distance trade in the nineteenth century. Here is another of Girenko's important theoretical points [174]:

> ... one must conclude that the *historical periodization* [a Soviet idiom often used in the general evolutionary sense] of patterns of relations based on kinship, when it is sufficiently researched, may provide a foundation for the periodization of forms of social organization pertaining to the archaic formation [*pervichnoĭ formatsii*].

The suggestion that general social evolution and patterns of kinship-based relations are so closely linked that the latter may be used as the foundation for the evolutionary typology of the former is, of course, not new in Soviet ethnography. However, no one prior to Girenko used a particular kinship terminology as a prime historical source for an in-depth social reconstruction and put it in such a general theoretical framework. His hint that evolution of patterns of relations based on kinship are insufficiently known (although he accepted

Kriukov's general scheme) meant simply that the old fundamentalist approach and its terminological framework are totally inadequate.

The earliest pattern of social organization among the Wanyamwezi that Girenko was able to reconstruct was based on sex and relative age. There appears to be plenty of data from East and Central Africa that lends itself to such an interpretation. Of course, Schurtz long ago proposed that relative age is the earliest principle of social organization. In a general way it was repeated by Rivers, and in Soviet ethnography, by Ravdonikas and especially, by Tolstov.

However, these were general theoretical positions illustrated by the method of survivals, taking examples from various cultures. Tolstov used the chronicles of some Turkic-speaking groups in Central Asia to propose the ancient character of age-classes and made a connection with the archaeological evidence from Khorezm [175]. Similar conclusions were reached by K.V. Trever, who analyzed the old Iranian term *"parna,"* and A.A. Popov, who studied the Dolgans and Nganasans in northwest Siberia [176]. An informative general anthology on Central Asia was put together as early as 1951 [177]. The mention of the extent to which sex/age stratification and its institutions had "survived" in various cultural contexts became commonplace in Soviet historical and ethnographic studies.

Girenko's contribution to this approach was the theory of *structural transformation* of that pattern into the next one (which he called "dual sectional epygamy," and which corresponds to the earliest phase in Kriukov's scheme). He demonstrated the possibility of such a transformation in the Wanyamwezi case.

This thesis found support in V.M. Misiugin's reconstruction of the system of age classes among the Galla of Ethiopia, based on the analysis of their history written by an Ethiopian monk in the sixteenth century [178]. Misiugin's point is that an *age-based* system may be perceived (in the usual ego-based terminology of reference) as a *kinship system* [179]. According to him, that is only the observer's impression, based on imposition of the kinship matrix on a system in which all terms express membership in particular age-groups (each with its name).

If Misiugin is correct (and there still are some questions concerning his tables), then it appears that the very concept of kinship, as used both in Soviet and Western anthropology and based on the matrix that is ultimately derived from the biological model of "basic" relationships, must be reconsidered. Indeed, we see the germ of this in Girenko's notion that the social organism of kinship exists in three main aspects, which would encompass the pattern based on age/sex stratification, as well as what is traditionally known as kinship.

CONCLUSION

In this article we have not attempted to cover the entire problematic or history of Russian-Soviet ethnography. Instead, we tried to explain the significance of the arguments about social theory and demonstrate why Soviet ethnography must be viewed as part of an intellectual tradition fundamentally different from the Western. At the same time, we believe that the theoretical tradition that took shape in the 1920s and the attempts to revive and further it, inconclusive as they may be, are of great potential significance to Western anthropologists.

Among the topics left out of consideration was, for example, the traditional and successful collaboration between ethnography and folklore studies culminating in the structural analysis of Russian fairy tales by Vladimir Ya. Propp [180]. We also did not discuss the study of religion, which in the 1930s–1950s was often disguised as folklore studies, and which in the Soviet context was obviously

limited by the doctrine dictating the approach to it as a disappearing form of social consciousness, an embarrassing survival of the past [181]. Another subject left out is the study of material culture and everyday life, which continues the pre-revolutionary Russian tradition. The same may be said about a more recent Soviet revival of interest in ethnicity in so far as it can be traced to the late nineteenth and early twentieth century concern with cultural and ethnic divisions [182]. This interest, of course, has much to do with the practical tasks of integrating over 100 nations, nationalities and various other ethnic groups into one "Soviet People."

The formation of the "Soviet people," which Lenin believed to be an inevitable result of education, and which Stalin spurred using massive violence, is viewed not only as both desirable and inevitable but as an actual reality. The coming into being of the "Soviet people" was proclaimed by Leonid Brezhnev a decade ago. The theory of ethnicity, as well as the whole problem of interethnic relations are so closely connected to the sensitive issues of nationality policy that even field ethnographers often see and report the desirable rather than the actual situation. The Soviet data, therefore, can be used only with great caution.

It is perhaps relevant to note the change that occurred in the Soviet attitude toward psychology. At one time practically banned (along with Freud) in favor of the "sociological" approach, social psychology, psycholinguistics, and "ethnopsychology" (a Soviet term) today are legitimate, though often doctrinally limited areas of inquiry [183]. Soviet ethnographers agree that the reflection in people's consciousness of their membership in an ethnos as ethnic self-awareness serves as the final proof of the "objective existence" of that ethnos [184].

Both in terms of the problems considered to fall within its scope and in terms of the approach to these problems, Soviet ethnography today comes closer to Shternberg's conception than to the view which prevailed after the All-Russian Archaeological-Ethnographic Conference of 1932 described earlier. Bromley claims that the conception of ethnography most widely shared among Soviet scientists today is of a science that deals with the characteristics of the daily life and belief systems of a people which distinguish them ethnically (i.e., culturally), and the origins (ethnogenesis) and history of the ethnic units defined by these characteristics. It embraces the history of culture of all peoples in the past as well as the present. To this end it makes use of data not only of the "historical sciences," but of the natural sciences (e.g., biology, ecology, geography) as these relate to formation and functioning of ethnos [185].

Broadly speaking, there are three major characteristics that determine the present status of Soviet ethnography:

First, there is an open acknowledgement of the validity of pre-revolutionary Russian tradition. One facet of this is a modest rivival of the Shternberg school that combined rigorous requirements for fieldwork (not unlike Boas) with ethnographers' active participation in the lives of the investigated peoples, and a broadly historical "dynamic" approach to culture.

Second, after a period of isolation, the best work in ethnography, as illustrated in the case of kinship studies, is strongly influenced by Western social anthropology. The language and concerns of these studies can be much easier understood in the West than, perhaps, any other Soviet writings. But one should not lose sight of the fact that basic assumptions, such as the general view of evolution, are not the same as in the West.

Third, the main struggle in Soviet ethnography now is not against "bourgeois theories." More and more it is centered around the inadequacy of the Soviet theoretical heritage itself.

The gains in kinship studies, the tacit return to the forcibly broken tradition of the 1920s in conceptualization of culture (Bogoraz, Bukharin) visible in the work of Markarian, and the possibility to question and reject particular hypotheses advanced by Morgan, Engels, or the early Soviet fundamentalists make Soviet ethnography a rich and exciting field. This impression is not diminished by the fact that the thorough theoretical revision of orthodoxy promised by PIDO Two in 1968 never materialized. The intellectual currents that produced it still exist and now and then surface, waiting for a time when the ideological climate improves.

An important thing to remember is that many theoretical positions in the Soviet Union are arrived at by "thrashing out" the issues in oral discussions until consensus is gradually formed, not by boldly proclaiming a new approach in an individual paper [186]. Olderogge's rejection of Morgan's Hawaiian hypothesis, as well as the whole project of PIDO Two are but two examples of consensus formed *before* they were published. We suspect that some work is being done, of which the short conference resumés (unavailable in the West) are often the only and cryptic witnesses.

The administrative control over Soviet ethnography remains in the hands of the fundamentalists, who associate "true Marxism" with doctrine and whose main task is to defend the hypotheses incorporated in official ideology. They are opposed by a vital group of scholars, who gain their inspiration from a general philosophical approach and method of conceptualization they find in classical Marxism. The division into these two camps is not at all clearcut; many people intermittently align themselves with one or the other. And of course, the strong current of Russian intellectual tradition (never demythologized) with its search for an integral and simultaneously ethical social theory brings many of them together.

But the discussions persist, and it appears that for non-fundamentalists Marxism provides only a *method* (and even this is understood in a variety of ways), a theory of cognition, the most general language of theory. No particular hypothesis is sacred. Since the method is not reducible to ethnographic theory, it does not in itself guarantee success. The theory has to be judged on its own merit, not by appeal to the "classics." These seem to be the unspoken points underlying the debate today.

What is at stake is not only the right of scientists to develop various perspectives on society, culture, and evolution. Whether or not the participants themselves would put it this way, it affects the very nature of theory in social sciences. The rallying point for the non-fundamentalists, regardless of their areas of research or their views on particular problems, is the tacit rejection of theory as doctrine. The revolt is against theory as quasi-religion, as the Absolute which is simultaneously a scientific and an ethical doctrine that pits "us" who know the Truth against "them" who do not: and this may be nothing less than the beginning of a fundamental break with the Russian intellectual tradition.

NOTES

1. Cz. Milosz, *The Captive Mind* (London: Mercury Books, 1962).
2. Examples would be the dispute in the 1960s and early 1970s over whether the commune (*obshchina*) or the unilineal kingroup (*rod*) was the "subject of the relations of production" of early preclass society; the debate of 1927–31, and again, from about 1964 to 1968, concerning whether economic classes must precede formation of the state; and the seemingly wholly esoteric disagreement of the 1950s with respect to one or two "dialectical leaps" in the transition from ape to human. The first two are discussed in our article.
3. S.P. Dunn and E. Dunn, *Introduction to Soviet Ethnography*, vols. 1 + 2, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).
4. Ibid., vol. I, p. 10.
5. E. Gellner, "The Soviet and the Savage," *Current Anthropology*, vol. 16 (1975), pp. 595–617.

6. E. Gellner, (ed.), *Soviet and Western Anthropology* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980).
7. Yurii Semënov is an intresting figure for analysis from a totally different perspective. He continues the tradition of nineteenth century Russian "social thought" (see note [40]), with its quest for the historical Absolute conducted in the authoritarian, uncomprising and maximalist fashion so well described by Nikolai Berdyaev. We shall see below how this tradition was coupled with the fundamentalist Soviet understanding of Marxism.
8. E. Gellner, op. cit., 1980, p. xxii.
9. V.R. Kabo, "Istoriia pervobytnogo obshchestva i etnografiia. (K probleme rekonstruktsii proshlogo po dannym etnografii.) Okhotniki – sobirateli – rybolovy. Problemy sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh otnoshenii v dozemledel' – cheskom obshchestve." (Leningrad: Nauka, 1972), pp. 54–58.
10. Her eight-page paper has 25 footnotes, fourteen of them quotes from the "classics."
11. Yu. Petrova-Averkieva, "Historicism in Soviet Ethnographic Science," in E. Gellner, op. cit., 1980, pp. 22 (italics added).
12. S.P. Tolstov, "K voprosu o periodozatsii istorii pervobytnogo obshchestva," *Sovetskaîa Etnografiîa*, vol. 1, pp. 25–30.
13. N. Berdyaev, *The Origin of Russian Communism* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960), p. 20.
14. S.R. Tompkins, *The Russian Intelligentsia* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1957); D. Treadgold, *The West in Russia and China* (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1973), vol. 1.
15. C.f., J. Billington *The Icon and the Axe: An Interpretive History of Russian Culture* (New York: Knopf, 1966).
16. This thesis, developed by the Hungarian sociologists, Gyorgy Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi (*The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, transl. by A. Arato and R. Allen, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979), may disclose a hitherto unsuspected foundation for continuity in Russian social theory and the political movements of the intellectuals from the Decembrists of 1825 to the victory of the Bolshevik Party in the Civil War (1918–1921). As early as 1904, Trotsky had noted that Lenin's proposals for organization of the Social Democratic Party substituted intellectuals as organized in this party for the working classes, which he said expressed aspirations of the intelligentsia to subordinate the workers to their own status interests as potential power brokers (discussed by I. Deutscher in 1954).
17. Suppression of "zoological individualism" is a central theme of Yuri Semënov's model of human emergence described in a later section of this article. Below we remark on the importance of a notion of hierarchy expressed in the concept of *chin* (rank) to the traditional Russian perception of the individual's place in the social and natural orders. There is a considerable Soviet literature on the relationship between "social" and "biological" in human evolution and existence. Most of it is highly abstract, cast in the "elevated" language of Soviet philosophy. Works of this sort are often very critical of Western philosopy, sociology and psychology (especially, Freudian), and serve mainly to expound ideologically correct counter positions (e.g., L.P. Bueva, *Man: His Behavior and Social Relations*, Moscow: Progress, 1981).

On the other hand, the founders of both the Leningrad and Moscow schools of ethnography after the Revolution, L. Shternberg and D. Anuchin, as well as V. Gorodtsov, an important figure in early Soviet prehistoric archaeology, analogized cultural evolution, which they viewed as the specific human mode of adaptation, to biological evolution. "Competition," however, took place among inventions, the most advantegeous of which were retained and transmitted within the inventor's group. "Western" thinking was also represented by Russian Marxist theoreticians of the revolutionary generation, who like N. Bukharin, sought to synthesize Marxism with evolutionary theory through a notion of ecological systems.

This less dogmatic attitude to the relationship between biological and social evolution is currently shared by a few Soviet ethnographers, physical anthropologists and historians. Perhaps the most prominent among them was the late Viktor Bunak, dean of Soviet physical anthropologists and a student of Anuchin. In his last major work, published posthumously (V.V. Bunak, Rod *Homo*, ego vozniknovenie i posleduîushchaîa evolîutsiîa, (Moskva: Nauka, 1980), he not only rejects the "promiscuous human herd" and "group marriage," two principal tenets of fundamentalist doctrine described below, on the grounds that they are inconsistent with evolutionary theory, but he suggests that the family based on bonding between a male and one or more females through the children he fathers appeared very early, arguing for the selective advantage of male parental investment, although without reference to Trivers or any other sociobiologist.

Any application of propositions akin to kin selection, parential investment, sexual selection, optimal foraging, or other theories dervied from the arsenal of evolutionary biology and ecology, to explain the origins of human social relations (in this case, the institutions of the family and marriage) is the exception in Soviet science. For instance, in the recent updating of his model, Semënov dismisses sociobiology out of hand on the grounds it reflects misunderstanding of the nature of human social relations, i.e., their hierarchical differentiation from the relations of "zoological alliances" (Predposylki stanovleniîa chelovecheskogo obshchestva. In the volume: Istoriîa pervobytnogo obshchestva. Obshchie voprosy. Prolemy antroposofsiogeneza, Moskva: Nauka, 1983, 231–232).

During the discussions at the beginning of the 1970s concerning ethnicity, one scientist, Lev Gumilëv, argued for the importance of ecological factors in the shaping of primitive ethnos, and suggested that, since they are characterized by endogamy, the fact that ethnicity is based on recognition of a common identity in opposition to outsiders may have a genetic basis. Apparently,

Gumilëv had in mind a genetic predisposition to extend kinship by creating a cultural definition through opposition to those, who do not "belong" culturally. During debate ethnographers unamimously rejected his thesis on the grounds that sharing of genes is not a criterion of membership in an ethnic group, even though Gumilëv was not arguing that ethnos share a gene-pool, only that the predisposition to create an ethnic identity originated in the sharing of genes (L. Gumilëv, O termine "etnos." Doklady geograficheskogo obshchestva SSSR, vyp. 3, Leningrad, 1967; Obsuzhdenie stat'i Iu.V. Bromleĭa "Etnos i endogamiĭa", *Sovetskaîa Etnografiîa*, 1970, vol. 3, pp. 86–103).

In general, Soviet ethnographers lack sophistication in all aspects of evolutionary theory, and are ideologically predisposed against Darwinian arguments. For instance, they object to the emphasis in evolutionary ecology and biology, as well as microeconomic theory, on decisions by individuals, because it conflicts with the Russian bias towards collective decision making. *How* individuals arrive at a "collective decision" is generally not considered.

18. P.F. Laptin, "Obshchina v russkoĭ istoriografii" (Kiev: Naukova Dumka," 1971), p. 10.
19. A firm believer in the evolution of nature and society even before reading Darwin, Chernyshevsky thought Darwin had been led astray by the sophist, Malthus. He despised Spencer (whom he was forced to translate for a living), and had contempt for Comte, whom he called a charleton. Chernyshevsky denounced as both immoral and self-serving the doctrine, popular among English and U.S. evolutionists, that improvement of the human species resulted from the victory of superior cultures, races, classes or individuals in a struggle for existence. Extermination of savages, he wrote, only makes savages out of the exterminators (N.G. Chernyshevskiĭ, "Polnoe sobranie sochineniĭ," Moskva: AN SSSR, 1951, Vol. XIV, pp. 551, 643, 644, 651; Vol. XV, p. 564).
20. Yu. Bromley, "Ethnographical Studies in the USSR, 1965–1969," in Yu. Bromley, (ed.), *Soviet Ethnology and Anthropology Today* (Paris: Mouton, 1974) p. 1 (original unedited English).
21. To give just one example: the Mezhov bibliographies published in nine volumes from 1861 to 1883 include over 12,000 titles of books, articles and pamphlets. For a list of principal bibliographies of books, journals, monographs and archives dealing with the ethnography of peoples of the USSR from 1851 to 1969, see Z.D. Titova, "Etnografiĭa, Bibliografiĭa russkikh bibliografiĭ po etnografii narodov SSSR (1851–1969) (Moskva: Kniga).
22. A.N. Pypin, "Istoriĭa russkoĭ etnografiĭa" (St. Petersburg: Tipografiĭa M.M. Stasĭulevicha, 1890–1892, Volumes I–IV).
23. Cf., A. Smirenko (ed.), *Soviet Sociology: Historical Antecedents and Current Appraisals* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1966).
24. E.g., N.I. Gagen-Torn, "Leningradskaĭa etnograficheskaĭa shkola v dvadtsatve gody (U istokov sovetskoĭ etnografii)," *Sovetskaîa Etnografiîa*, vol. 2 (1977), pp. 134–145.
25. S. Tokarev, "Istoriĭa russkoĭ etnografii (Dooktĭabr'skiĭ period)" (Moskva: Nauka, 1966).
26. During the 1870s, the well-known nineteenth century Russian liberal publicist and ethnographer, Sergei V. Maksimov (1831–1901), even wrote a program for studying the urban merchant classes and intellectuals (St. Petersburg; Sobranie sochinenii S.V. Maksimova, 1913, v. 11). Vasilii Vasilevich Bervi, a social scientist who wrote for the underground using the name, N. Flerovskii (he was author of the pseudo-religious pamphlet, *On the Martyr, Nicholas, and How to Live According to the Law of Nature and Righteousness*, used by narodniks among the peasants), published in 1869 a 500-page ethnographical-sociological study of the peasants, miners, factory and agricultural workers, *The Situation of the Working Class in Russia* (N. Flerovskiĭ, Polozhenie rabochego klassa v Rossii, Nabludeniĭa i issledovaniĭa, SPb, N. Polyakov, 1869. A revised and expanded edition, which could not be published during his lifetime, was printed in Moscow in 1938). Karl Marx may have learned Russian specifically to read this book (F. Venturi, *Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia*, transl. by F. Haskell, New York; Knopf, 1966; pp. 487–499; O.V. Aptekman, Vasilii Vasil'evich Bervi-Flerovskii po materialam byvshego III Otdeleniĭa i D.G.P. Leningrad, 1925).
27. Yu. Bromley, op. cit., p. 17.
28. S. Dunn and E. Dunn, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 2.
29. Apparently the Dunns were unaware of this relationship, when they wrote (ibid., 4) that Miklukho-Maklay "seems in some ways a rather odd choce for this role, since the tradition in which he worked was not continued." That depends on how one defines this "tradition." Soviet ethnographers tend to think of him as an exemplar of all that was best in the traditions of Russian ethnography, which they strive to emulate.

    While some mystery surrounds the relevant period in Miklukho-Maklay's personal history, cultivated by him probably to protect his family, there seems little doubt that like his brother, Vladimir, and sister, Olga, he had links with the radical democracy. The spirit of the sixties permeates his letters to his younger brother, not to mention his scheme to establish Russian peasant communes on the Maclay Coast!

    His political views are indicated also by his instructions to his wife to burn all his letters and original field journals should there be a danger of their falling into the hands of the tsarist authorities. It is largely because Margaret had to carry out his wishes that we know so little about this aspect of his private life.
30. N.N. Miklukho-Maklai, "Sobranie sochineniĭ," (Moskva-Leningrad: AN SSSR, Volumes I–V (six books), 1950–1954), vol. IV: p. 485.
31. The third of the noted Russian ethnographers of the "minority peoples of the North," Vladimir (Waldemar) Jochelson (1855–1937) had the most impressive credentials as a professional revolutionary. He evaded efforts of the tsarist secret police to capture him for

over a decade, during which he was one of the most active workers, first, of "Land and Freedom" (*Zemlia i Volia*), and later, of "Peoples' Will." But while he also began his scientific research in exile, Jochelson's career in ethnography reflects more the traditions of Boasian "historical particularist" anthropology than Russian ethnography. Bogoraz as well as Jochelson spent years in the USA before the Revolution. Both were closely associated with Franz Boas (1858–1942) (the connection between Boas and the origins of Soviet ethnography is a subject worthy of special study: it may be significant, for instance, that all four men shared a strong Jewish heritage – Jochelson apparently was raised as an Hasid). When Jochelson left Russia in 1922, he never returned. He spent most of the rest of his life in the USA working on and publishing the vast materials he had collected during the Jessup North Pacific Expeditions (1899–1902, 1908–1911). Jochelson's major contribution was his discovery and investigation of the Yukaghir early in his career. The Yukaghir are thought by many to have been a submerged remnant of the ancient population of northeastern Siberia, predating the Chukchee and Eskimo occupations. Much of Jochelson's material awaits publication, being stored at least in part in the American Museum of Natural History, along with materials collected by Bogoraz.

32. G.P. Fedotov, *The Russian Religious Mind: Kievan Chirstianity* (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1946), p. 208.
33. L. Uspensky and V. Lossky *The Meaning of Icons* (Boston: Little Brown, 1952), p. 39.
34. It appears, therefore, that we can look mainly to the Slavophiles for the origins of the sentiment, so widespread among radicals and revolutionaries of the "Narodnik" era, which ascribed to the peasantry powers to apprehend revealed order precisely because in their ignorance of civilization (*prosveshchenie*) they retained some intuitive knowledge of eternal (or instinctual) truths. Freed from the fetters of chaos (*bezobrazie*) generated by imposition through force and deception of an "order" of privilege, it was felt that the peasant masses could engender equality spontaneously from the village commune, thereby resurrecting the natural harmony lost when exploitative relations tore apart the primitive (*pervobytnaia*) community. Sentiments of this sort occur in programs of all the peasant communalist (*narodnik*) sects and parties from 1863 to 1885. Inspired by them, most revolutionaries rejected political actions in favor of personal example, "propoganda of the deed." One could almost say that commune replaced Tsar as a collective representation to become the icon (*obraz*) of a natural order. Incidentally, the term *narodnik*, which is usually translated as "populist," had nothing to do with voter popularity, as "populist" implies. Rather, it was derived from *narodnost'* in the sense of "spirit of the people," signifying those who sought to represent and convey this spirit. The Russian word for "society" (*obshchestvo*) is dervied from the word for "commune" (*obshchina*).
35. Cf., N. Riasanovsky, *Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825–1855* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959). Uvarov advanced the idea in 1833, in an official circular. In the Slavophiles' notion of the "Trinity," land and folk were the generative principles, the primordial source, in opposition to the Imperial principle, introduced from the West by Peter I, which threatened to dissolve the ancient heritage in a sea of alien customs adopted by the educated elite from the non-Orthodox peoples incorporated into the Empire.
36. James H. Billington, op. cit., 1966, p. 304, suggests that Uvarov was influenced by higher order Masonry. The Uvarov family traced descent to Uvar, a son of the Tatar aristocrat, Mirza Minchak Kosa, emissary of the Great Orda to Grand Duke Vasilii Dmitrevich (1389–1425). Count Uvarov's son, Aleksei (1828–1884), was patron of "primitive" archaeology in Russia and founder of the Moscow Archaeological Society, prior to the Revolution the most important nongovernmental institution for the study of prehistoric remains, and initiator of national conferences of archaeologists and ethnographers, today held annually in the USSR.
37. Ibid, p. 324.
38. A. von Haxthausen, *The Russian Empire, Its People, Institutions and Resources*, translated by R. Farie (London, 1856), volumes I–II. Abridged from the original: A. von Haxthausen, *Studien uber die innern Zustande, das Volksleben und insbesondere die landlichen Einrichtungen Russlands* (Hannover u. Berlin, 1847–1852), volumes I–III.
39. Cited in F. Venturi, op. cit, p. 20. During the reform period (1855–1864), reformers opposed to violent change, and radicals, believing that only revolution could renovate the system, were divided on the issue of the peasant commune. Both tended to see in the commune evidence that Russia retained moral qualities lost to the bourgeois world, an attitude that became especially prevalent after 1848. But whereas the liberals traced this moral advantage mainly to features of Russian or Slav culture and religion, the radicals ascribed it mainly to the accidents of history whereby in Russia an institution had survived that was characteristic of a stage in social evolution when equality and mutual aid had been universal, a condition no longer met with anywhere in the "civilized" West.
40. According to J. Billington, op. cit., 1966, pp. 371–401, inverted religiosity was a quality of "social thought" (*obshchestvennaia mysl'*), the passionate, intensely moral, and often chaotic critique of social life offered together with visionary cures by the Russian "democratic" (utopian socialist) intelligentsia during the period from about 1840 to 1885. It appears to have declined in the degree that opportunities for political struggle emerged, being replaced by the development of social theory, mainly evolutionist and Marxist oriented, with a corresponding shift to the empirical investigation of social problems. However, it has tended to reappear whenever political solutions become impossible.

    A variety of ethnographic works published during the second half of the nineteenth century were informed by "social thought." Examples include publications of

Sergei Maksimov and Mikhail Mikhailov resulting from their participation in the "literary expedition" of 1855–57, and writings of Ivan Khudiakov and Vladimir Bogoraz. Indeed, a high proportion of the ethnographic research in this period was undertaken by individuals, whose scientific interests were stimulated and sustained by what can only be called a religious state of mind.

Isaiah Berlin, "Introduction," in F. Venturi, op. cit., p. xii, observed that the *narodnik*-inspired "pilgrimages to the people" (*khozhdeniia v narod*) of 1863 and 1873 – especially the latter, in which as many of 4,000 men and women took part – were made by the "repentant gentry," young intellectuals who sought to purify themselves of the corrupting effects of a liberal education which, by lifting the individual above the people and alienating him or her from the collective, "makes for deep inequalities... and so itself becomes the richest breeding-ground of injustice and class-oppression." At the heart of *narodnik* and later "social thought" was the belief in redemption, in "the pattern of sin and fall and resurrection – of the road to earthly paradise the gates of which will only open if men find the one true path and follow it" (ibid, p. xiv). Vasilii Bervi (N. Flerovskii), referred to in note [26], compared the deeds of the young pilgrims with those of the first Christians, and in later years suggested that if their thinning ranks were filled "by new believers, who like the first Christians, would be consumed by mounting enthusiasm, success would be ensured" (O. Aptekman, "Flerovskii-Bervi i kruzhok Dolgushina," *Byloe*, vol. 18 (1922), pp. 59, 60.

41. J. Billington, op. cit., 1966, p. 373. In the current conflict between "liberals" and "conservatives," the "Westernizer-Slavophile" dichotomy appears once again, with the former defending the legitimacy of competing social interests and the latter, "the organic unit of society." "So you see," said Ann Smith to her husband, Hedrick, "it's nothing new. It was the same under the czars. They're the same people" in H. Smith, *The Russians*, (New York: Ballentine, 1976), p. 682.
42. The number of works published on the Russian peasant commune alone can be judged from the following: the bibliography appended to Volume I of the anthology edited by F. Barykov, A. Polovtŝev and P. Sokolovskiĭ (Sbornik materialov dlîa izucheniîa sel'skoĭ pozeml'noĭ obshchiny, St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo VEO i IRGO, 1880) lists 654 works published in the thirty years from 1850 to 1880, of which 376 were in the five years, 1876–80; in volumes 3 and 4 of Evgenii Yakushkin's bibliographies of "Customary Law" (1908 and 1909) devoted exclusively to the Russian agricultural commune ("methods of land holding and use") over 2,000 titles are listed for the years 1876 to 1904. E.I. Iakushkin, "Obychnoe pravo, Materialy dlîa bibliografii obychnogo prava" (Moskva: Vypusk 3, 1908; Moskva: Vypusk 4, 1909).
43. Nikolai Ivanovich Ziber (Sieber: 1844–88), economist and radical publicist, was the first to popularize Marx's economic writings in Russia. Born at Sudak in the Crimea (his father was a Swiss national), Ziber organized a *Narodnik* commune with a Ukrainian nationalist program, "The Young Commune" (Molodaîa hromada), whose members studied Marx's writings. Fedor Volkov (Khvedor Vovk: 1847–1918), the leading pre-revolutionary archaeologist of the Paleolithic, belonged to this group. Ziber's dissertation for his degree from the Law Faculty of Kiev University, entitled, *David Ricardo's Theory of Value and Capital in Light of Later Classifications*, was highly praised by Marx in a lengthy preface to the second edition of the first volume of *Das Kapital*. In the "circles" where they studied revolution druing the 1880s and the early 1890s, radicalized students often learned their Marx from the second edition of this work, to which Ziber had added a detailed exposition of *Das Kapital*, because the Russian translation of Marx's work was seldom available.
44. The term, *rod*, standard in Soviet primitive history and usually translated as "clan," has no exact English equivalent. From it was derived the term, *rodovoe obshchestvo*, to designate all forms of primitive (in Russian, literally "primordial") society, with the exception of societies directly transitional to class society. This term is invested with a complex of features not present in any of the conceptions of "clan" developed by British and U.S. anthropologists. Its primary meaning is a universal stage in the scheme of evolution from "pre-*rod*" (*dorodovoe*) to class society, characterized by egalitarian relations, initially wholly communistic, but gradually becoming less so as the system (*stroĭ*) approaches the class stage. More recently, a compromise term, "the communal-*rod* system" (*obshchinno-rodovoi stroĭ*), has come into use combining the principle of the economic commune conceived as "base" with the principle of a group of blood relatives as "superstructure." Ethnographers generally avoid the latter term as too loaded, but it is routinely used when doctrine is stressed, such as in the schools. Throughout this article, we translate *rod* as "unilineal kingroup" sometimes abbreviated as UKG for convenience, except where "clan," as it is usually understood in Anglo-American anthropology, is literally correct. This subject is further dealt with in *The Study of Kinship*, below.
45. A. Zolotarëv, "Obshchestvennye otnosheniîa dorodovoĭ kommuny," N. Matorin, (ed.), Pervobytnoe obshchestvo. Sbornik statelĭ (Moskva, Zhurnal'no-gazetnoe ob"edinenie, 1932), pp. 77–104.
46. S.P. Tolstov, "Perezhitki totemizma i dual'noĭ organizatŝii turkmen, Problemy istorii dokapitalisticheskikh obshchestv," 1935, p. 9.
47. E.g., A. Reuel', "Polemika vokrug Kapitala Karla Marksa v Rossii 1870–ykh godov." (Letopis' Marksizma, 1930), p. 11.
48. Note that by raising this to a conscious interest and enabling the proletariat to act on it, the intelligentsia organized in the party of proletarian revolution became in effect emissaries of transcendent truth. See note [16].
49. Kovalevsky was a Russian-Polish aristocrat, whose father owned an estate in Kharkov Province. After graduating from the Law Faculty of Kharkov University in 1873, he went abroad to study in Berlin, Paris and London as

was the custom for wealthy Russians. In London he met Sir Herbert Spencer and Sir Henry Maine. The selection of problems and the approach initially adopted by Kovalevsky appear to have been strongly influenced by Maine's ethnography, but Kovalevsky departed from Maine in his conclusions and views on social evolution. While in London, Kovalevsky also made the acquaintance of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1874), with whom he maintained a correspondence for many years. Upon his return to Russia in 1877, he was awarded a Masters and a post at Moscow University, which became a full professorship after he received a Doctoral degree in 1881. In the years 1883, 1885 and 1887 he conducted ethnographic research among the Ossetian and Svan peoples in the Caucasus, at first in the company of the philologist-ethnographer Vsevolod Miller, who published many works on language, ethnogenesis and folklore of the peoples of Transcaucasia. In 1890, Kovalevsky was expelled from Moscow University by decree of the Minister of Education shortly after publishing a book, *Law and Custom in the Caucasus* (Zakon ii obychaĭ na Kavkaze), in which he was construed (correctly) to advocate a constitutional monarchy for Russia. Being independently wealthy and fluent in English, French, German and Italian, he moved to France, where he acquired a manorial estate on the Mediterranean. During the fifteen years he resided at Beaulieu, he accepted visiting professorships in Stockholm, Brussels, Oxford, and elsewhere. He visited the USA twice. In 1901 he founded the Russian Higher School of Social Sciences in Paris for the comparative study of society and culture. Among the Russian emigrés who lectured there was Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Kovalevsky returned to Russia in 1907, becoming a professor at the University of St. Petersburg (now Leningrad). His funeral in 1916 was a national event. Kovalevsky's research on the peasant community, its structure, origins and dissolution, was highly rated by Marx – especially his contribution to understanding peasant land tenure, "Obshchinnoe zemlevladenie, prichiny, khod i posledstviia ego razlozheniia," Moscow, 1879. His development of the idea that the patriarchal extended family household is a particular form of dissolution of the community of kin and that the switch from matriliny to patriliny inevitably led to rupture of the constitution of the "gens" (*rod*) became, with modifications, an element of the Soviet theory of primitive history. His theories of the structure and evolution of early society influenced the thinking of Nikolai Bukharin, both directly and through the writings of Alexander Bogdanov.

50. M.M. Kovalevskiĭ, "Ocherk proiskhozhdeniia i razvitiia sem'i i sobstvennosti," (St. Petersburg, 1896), pp. 12–13.
51. Run as a commercial venture from 1898 to 1901, the Bureau accepted only facts: "co-workers" were forbidden to include opinions, draw conclusions, make general observations. They were paid by the sheet. The ethnographer, Sergei V. Maksimov (see note [26]), was initially in charge of recieving and preparing manuscripts. Of 1,444 received from 348 "co-workers," 1,218 were accepted for use. These lie today in the archives of the Ethnographic Museum of the Peoples of the USSR (Leningrad), awaiting an enterprising graduate student. Dmitrii Zelenin (1878–1954), who was placed in charge of the first program in Russian and East Slav ethnography in the school of ethnography founded by Shternberg after the Revolution, and who later was severely criticized for his view that a Finnish substratum contributed substantially to formation of the Eastern Slav nationalities, was among the most active of Tenishev's "co-workers." According to Tokarev, op. cit. 1966, p. 404, Tenishev's aim was to create a science of human behavior allowing actions to be predicted with mathematical precision (he was a mathematician specializing in probability theory).
52. N. Iâ. Marr, "Îazykovaîa politika îafeticheskoĭ teorii i udmurtskiĭ îazyk, Uchenye zapiski Nauchno-issledovatel'skogo in-ta narodov Sev." Vostoka pri TsIK SSSR (Moskva, 1931), vol. 1, p. 9. In this and other articles, Marr argued that neither ethnography nor archaeology could have the status of sciences in so far as they were wholly subordinate theoretically to history and linguistics. His role in the development of a "Soviet" science of primitive history and status as the only member of the Imperial Academy of Sciences to sit on the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, guaranteed that his opinions would carry considerable weight. However, as one of us already argued (J.E. Howe, "Pre-agricultural Society in Soviet Theory and Method," *Arctic Anthropology*, vol. 13 (1976, pp. 84–115), the notion that Marr was to be blamed for the dogmatic evolutionism reducing all development ot the "internal dialectic," which ostensibly constituted "theory" in archaeology, ethnography and linguistics from about 1938 to 1949, was invented because the true reasons could not be discussed (see below).
53. Komissîa po izucheniîu plemennogo sostava narodov Rossii; at the beginning of this century, the adjective, *plemennoĭ*, lit., "tribal," was used like the German *Stamm* in combinations to designate what we would today term an ethnolinguistic community.
54. Dmitrii Anuchin (see below) established a parallel Department of Ethnography in the Geography Faculty at Moscow University, but from his death in 1923 until the 1940s, it occupied a decidedly secondary position. Important independent programs in ethnography also existed at Kiev, Kazan', and several other universities until repressed in the late 1920s and early 1930s.
55. N.I. Gagen-Torn, op. cit., p. 143.
56. Concerning sacrifices expected of students, Bogoraz said: "... only a person who is not afraid to feed the lice a pound of his blood can become an ethnographer ... Why, you ask, must one feed the lice? Because you can know a people and study them only if you share their lives. And lice are an animal they are quite familiar with, thank you. When doing field work, the ethnographer has no right to expect comfort, or even, hygiene" (cited by Gagen-Torn, op. cit., p. 140, from her lecture notes). This was said about the time a typhus epidemic was ending; and in many rural areas people were going

hungry, if not actually starving.

57. L.Îa. Shternberg, "D.N. Anuchin kak etnograf," *Etnografiûa*, vol. 1-2 (1926), pp. 7–8. Dmitrii N. Anuchin (1843–1923) was a man of extraordinary energy as well as erudition. Originally trained in history, he switched to zoology and later became the foremost Russian theoretical geographer. He is credited with being the first in Russia to put geography, ethnography and physcial anthropology on a professional level by establishing academic programs. He was primarily responsible for creation of the Geography Faculty at Moscow University, in which he introduced both ethnography and physical anthropology specializations. As the President of the Society of Amateur Naturalists, Anthropologists and Ethnographers (Obshchestvo lîubiteleĭ estestvoznaniîa, antropologii i etnografii) at Moscow University, he developed programs both in physical anthropology and prehistoric archaeology. He worked closely with Uvarov in the Moscow Archaeological Society and was from its founding to his death the director of the Museum of Anthropology of Moscow University. He published over 200 works. He was widely traveled and highly respected abroad, where he was elected to honorary memberships in various scientific institutions. He was a member of the Imperial Academy of Sciences. He created and held the Chair of Anthropology (in the sense of a universal science of humankind) at Moscow University from 1881 to 1884, when it was abolished because a universal science of human experience tended to undermine ruling ideology founded on religious doctrine. After the Revolution, Anuchin entered enthusiastically into the organization of a new anthropology department. However, his conception of a universal science once again encountered obstacles in official doctrine (see below). Had he lived, he undoubtedly would have had a greater impact on the development of ethnography in the USSR. His student, Victor Bunak, was for many years the leading Soviet physical anthropologist (he died in 1979).

58. N.I. Gagen-Torn, op. cit., p. 142. See also S.A. Rattner-Shternberg. L.Ia. Shternberg i Leningradskaîa etnograficheskaîa shkola 1904–1927 gg: (Po lichnym vospominaniîam i arkhivnym dannym). *Sovetskaîa Etnografiîa*, vol. 2 (1935), pp. 134–54. Shternberg's "credo" is set forth in an unusual "religious" document, the *Ethnographer's Ten Commandments*, which we can imagine was only half in jest:

1. Ethnography crowns the humanitarian sciences for it studies all peoples, the whole of humanity in the past and present, from all aspects.
2. Idolize not thine own people and culture. Know that all peoples are potentially equal: erect no idols, wave no banners, neither for Hellas nor for Judea, for the white skin nor for the colored. He who knows but one people knows none; he who knows but one religion or culture knows none.
3. Profane not science and defile not ethnography by careerism: only he who is sustained by enthusiasm for science and love for humanity and human beings can be a true ethnographer.
4. Work six days and on the seventh, summarize the results. Remember thy duty to science and society.
5. Honor thy great predecessors and teachers of science and social awareness in order that thou mayst be honored in turn for thy services.
6. Kill not science by falsifying the facts, by superficial inaccurate observations, by hasty conclusions.
7. Betray not thy chosen profession, ethnography. He who enters on the path of ethnograpy must never stray from it.
8. Commit not plagiarisms.
9. Bear not false witness against those nearest to thee, other peoples, their character, rituals, customs, norms and so on. Love those nearest more than thyself.
10. Force not thy culture on the people thou studiest: approach them with caution and care, with attention and love, no matter what level of culture they are on, and they will strive to raise themselves to the level of the higher cultures.

59. A particularly harmful example that occurred during "collectivization" in the Far north resulted from reduction of status ranking based on redistributive exchanges among families, who were related and dependent on each other, to differences in class. In the conditions of the North, where food supplies were subject to extreme fluctuations, dependency relations were a guarantee of survival. Without a thorough understanding of the functional basis of patron–client and other types of status differences, exploitative elements in status hierarchies could not be distinguished from elements necessary to maintain the system of subsistence production, with disastrous results. In general, the treatment of all shamans in the North and of all mullas in Central Asia and the Caucasus as class enemies lead to breakdown in understanding between Russians and "natives," with the result that the former had to impose their ways on the latter by force. While done in the name of "Marxian class analysis," to an ethnographer it must seem like ideological justificcation for racism, cultural chauvinism and religious intolerance, violating the basic principles of the ethnographer's "creed" reproduced in note [58].

60. N. Bukharin, *Historical Materialism: A System of Sociology* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1969 (original: 1921)).

61. By no accident, the newspaper of the Communist Party is called *Pravda*, which glosses as "truth" in the sense of "the true way," with the deeper meaning of "according to moral law." As mentioned earlier, "Orthodox Christianity" in Russian is *pravoslavie*. *Pravo* glosses as "justice, lawful right, equity" (*Russkia Pravda* was the name given to the legal code of the Ancient Rus'). *Pravda* is in symmetrical opposition to *krivda*, which glosses as "fraud, trickery," hence, "deviation, inequity." "Truth" in the narrow meaning of "verity," or "that which really exists," is *istina*.

The official government newspaper is called *Izvestiîa*, a neutral term glossing as "informational news and official notices." By implication, the Party, as guardian of moral right through its collective knowledge of higher laws, is

not corrupted by the day-to-day conduct of earthly affairs that may lead local officials astray.

62. V.G. Tan-Bogoraz, "K voprosu o primeneii marksitskogo metoda k izuchenii etnografîcheskikh îavleniĭ, *Ethnografîa* vol. 1-2 (1930), pp. 4–6. Bogoraz was a less dogmatic evolutionist than Shternberg. For instance, he argued that "a fundamental form of the primitive family" could not be determined in so far as both monogamous and polygamous families and "social and individual forms of marriage" occurred among living primitive peoples. In contrast, Shternberg adhered rigidly to Morgan's "stages." Bogoraz also disputed on functional grounds the primacy of matrilineal filiation, which he argued (following Baumann and Ankermann) was more likely to have developed on the basis of hoe horticulture than hunting. He noted patriarchal norms among all the hunting and fishing peoples of eastern Siberia. Incidentally, Bogoraz, who was an extremely profilic writer both of scientific and literary works (his collected novels, short stories, essays, and poems comprised twelve volumes in the first edition), published at least nineteen works in English, including five books in the *Memoirs* series of the American Museum of Natural History, a volume in the Museum's *Anthropological Papers*, a volume for the American Ethnological Society, and articles in the *American Anthropologist* of 1901, 1902 and 1929, and the *Journal of American Folkore* in 1928.
63. D. Joravsky, *Soviet Marxism and Naturąl Science, 1917–1932* (New York: Columbia University, 1961). Bukharin was accused of being a "Mechanistic (or Mechanical) Materialist" in opposition to the philosopher, Deborin, who led the campaign for "Dialectical Materialism," which conveyed the meaning of a totalizing doctrine of truth. It would have been more accurate to call Bukharin a "method Marxist," in so far as he viewed Marxism primarily as "the dialectical method" applied in various spheres of knowledge.
64. In ordinary usage, the word designates any insect that damages crops. Hence, its application to people was also derogatory, humiliating.
65. When ethnography is mentioned in other works dealing with introduction of "Party spirit" into science and education, it is generally in connection with Nikolai Marr, whose role has been greatly overemphasized as a result of insufficiently critical acceptance of a myth largely created by Stalin. For general background to the period see R. Gonquest, *The Great Terror* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), and R. Medvedev, *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism* (New York: Knopf, 1971). A number of documents were abridged or left out by the translator; see original: R.A. Medvedev, "K sudu istorii, Genezis i posledstviîa stalinizma, Izdanie pererabotannoe" (New York: Knopf, 1974).
M.A. Miller, Arkheologiîa v SSSR, Munich, Institut po izucheniîu istorii i kul'tury SSSR (1954) (Issledovaniîa i materialy, Seriîa 1, No. 12), gives a brief and not very satisfactory account of what happened to archaeology.
J.E. Howe, "The Soviet Theories of Primitive History: Forty Years of Speculation on the Origins and Evolution of People and Society" (Seattle: University of Washington, 1980), unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, covers some of the developments in "primitive history." Finally, a rather full account of the transformation of history is given by K.F. Shteppa, *Russian Historians and the Soviet State* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1962). While leaving many questions unanswered, the account of this period in the "official" Soviet history of the historical sciences is generally accurate, so far as it goes: cf., "Ocherki istorii istoricheskikh nauk v SSSR." (Moskva, Izd. AN SSSR, volume III, 1963, and volume IV, 1966). Soviet works suffer greatly from the impossibility of giving full evaluation of the impact of Bukharin's ideas and of the manner in which they were subsequently dismissed: cf., D. Joravsky, op. cit., and S.F. Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888–1938* (New York: Vintage, 1975).
66. Discussed in: A. Nove, *Political Economy and Soviet Socialism* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1978); same, *An Economic History of the USSR*, revised edition (Middlesex: Penguin, 1982); also, A. Kahan, "Agriculture," in A. Kassoff (ed.), *Prospects for Soviet Society* (New York: Prager, 1968, pp. 263–90.
67. Among the Party cadre most responsible for introducing "Party spirit" into ethnography and archaeology, Matorin, Bykovskii, and Kiparisov were repressed (the latter was shot). Among students, Julia Averkieva suffered especially for her training and fieldwork in the USA under Boas.
68. Cf., K. Shteppa, op. cit.; D. Joravsky, op. cit.
69. PIDO Number One was a journal published during 1934 and 1935, containing dicussion papers on stages in human biological and social evolution that defined the periods of "primitive history," after which theoretical debate was cut off for twenty years. Calling a book in which this earlier discussion is reexamined and resumed by the same name was considered to be highly symbolic. Symbols are very important to Soviet readers, whose skill in speaking and deciphering "Aesopian language" is inherited from pre-revolutionary generations.
70. During the reign of Alexander I and in the first years following abolition of serfdom. Billington demonstrated that succession of relative liberalism and conservatism is characteristic of Russian history.
71. Cf., S.F. Cohen, "The Friends and Foes of Change: Reformation and Conservatorism in the Soviet Union," in S.F. Cohen, A. Rabinowith and R. Sharlet (eds.), *The Soviet Union Since Stalin* (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1980), pp. 18–19.
72. It is important to recognize that the division between "reformers" and "conservatives" was no more a division between "democrats" and "authoritarians," or between "liberals" and "reactionaries," than the earlier Westernizer-Slavophile contrast. For instance, the dissident intellectuals include those who, like Solzhenitsyn, see salvation for Russia in a restoration of the "eternal values of the Russian people" preserved and transmitted in *Pravoslavie*, rejecting the materialism and egoism of Western society as infections that undermine the

"organic unity of society." Marxism-Leninism is evil because it is the most extreme form of Western rationalism, substituting a religion of Man for the Higher Truth.

73. V.I. Ravdonikas, "O sushchnosti razvitiĭa doklassovogo obshchestva" (Soobshcheniĭa GAIMK, 1932), vol. 5-6, p. 47. This was the revised text of a report given at the behest of the Party. The cited two sentences were included in the opening paragraph. That they constituted a warning is unmistakable from the context: the threat of "fatal consequences" was meant to be taken literally. "Methdological" was a code term for the application of *partiinost'* ("Party spirit") in particular sciences. Concerning the use of "essence" in Soviet Marxism, see the comments below on Yurii Semënov.
74. The corresponding discussions in the natural sciences between adherents of "dialectical" and "mechanistic," i.e., reductionist, approaches and the organizational consequences are dealt with in the book of David Joravsky already cited (1961) and in Loren R. Grahem, *The Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Communist Party, 1927–1932* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967). On the theoretical level, see L.R. Graham, *Science and Philosophy in the Soviet Union* (New York: Knopf, 1972).
75. K. Shteppa, op. cit., p. 95.
76. Associated with the so-called Deborinites, this interpretation was by no means universally accepted by "Marxist-Leninist" theoreticians prior to 1932. In particular, it was not shared by Nikolai Bukharin.
77. This classification of sciences according to manifestation of the universal dialectic achieved something akin to the *chin* (rank) of the *ikonostasis*: the taxonomy of knowledge became a representation (*obraz*) of order in the world. To many believers set adrift by disappearance of traditional norms and values transmitted through religious faith and rituals, if not to scientists and Party intellectuals, who unwittingly set up this *chin*, adherence to the doctrinally defined code of order promised control of the universe. It is not essential to understand such codes, only to obey them. Indeed, in so far as they are perceived to be transcendental, they *cannot* be understood by those to whom they are not revealed. Disorder arises not from failure of the codes – that would be inconceivable – but from disobedience to them. While said to have a "single will," the Party is in fact millions of individuals from whose "monolithic unity" is derived the transcendent authority to interpret doctrine invested in "the People's Guide" (*vozhd' naroda*), as Stalin was called.
78. Rezolîutsii Vserosiĭskogo arkheologo-etnograficheskogo soveshchaniĭa 7-11 maĭa 1932 goda." (Soobshcheniĭa GAIMK, 1932) vol. 5-6, p. 93.
79. Ibid., paragraph 31.
80. In 1932, the issue of whether a "group marriage" stage preceded the establishment of "pair bonded families" (syndiasmian families in Lewis Henry Morgan's terminology) and of the order of appearance of matrilineal versus patrilineal affiliation had not been settled, much less transformed into doctrine, a process that was not completed until after 1934: cf. remarks in N.A. Butinov, "Pervobytnoobshchinnyĭ stroĭ (osnovny etapy i lokal'nye varianty). Problemy istorii dokapitalisticheskikh obshchestv," Book 1, (Moskva: Nauka, 1968), pp. 89–155.
81. Franz Boas was looked upon as personally free of taint and a "friend of the Soviet people," but in ideological servitude to the pragmatism and darkly pessimistic "agnostism" with respect to theory that permeated bourgeois science.
82. Op. cit., p. 19.
83. E.g., M. Fainsod, *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule* (New York: Knopf, 1958).
84. Thus, Matorin wrote (Sovremennyĭ etap i zadachi sovetskoĭ etnografii, Sovetskaĭa Etnografiĭa, 1931, vol. 1-2, p. 6) that, "At best overemphasis on the geographical environment leads to 'geographical materialism,' which if substituted for historical materialism... would constitute a genuine theoretical revision of this doctrine."
85. N. Bukharin, op. cit., pp. 111, 118–20. The "political" meaning of the theory of "functional homeostasis" was spelled out by Victor Adoratskii as follows (O teoreticheskikh osnovakh markisizma, Bol'shevik, 1931, vol. 18, p. 57): "Such antidialectial, antirevolutionary theories as, for example, understanding contradiction to be solely external rather than present inside every phenomenon, in our situation reflects the interests of the bourgeoisie in theory. Such doctrines theoretically ground the denial of class contradictions, the class struggle of the proletariat, and promote preaching of class peace between proletariat and bourgeoisie. The mechanistic theory of equilibrium, the doctrine of a reciprocal relationship between system and environment, belongs in this category. A doctrine of this sort enables a theoretical foundation to be inserted under the theory that kulak hotbeds will grow into socialism through the cooperatives. This theory substantiates and justifies a rightest political line, according to which as a rule it is not worth disturbing the kulak." A coarse, rude manner of expression was frequently affected at this time to imitate Stalin.
86. Concerning pre-revolutionary archaeology, it was said that, while changes in culture "were somehow connected to alterations in social life... the motive force... remained in the shadows, or more often, was transferred outside. In some variants, such as the theory of migrations, or of borrowings, or of culture circles, the racial theory came to the aid of the formalist-thing-worshiping archaeologist" (M.G. Khudîakov, "Dorevolîutsionaia russkaĭa arkheologiia na sluzhbe ekspluatatorskikh klassov" (Biblioteka GAIMK, 13, Leningrad, 1933), p. 13). Thus, migration and diffusion were additionally condemned as racist.
87. And also perhaps because the Party's theoreticians, in general not field workers, had never experienced the disorientation that takes place when one can no longer rely on the rules of one's own culture.
88. A certain amount of ethnographic fieldwork was conducted during the late 1930s and immediately after the war to collect examples of folklore, the folk arts, including music, evidence for survival of pre-christian

religious practices, etc. As for prehistoric archaeology, fieldwork greatly increased during the 1930s and 1940s Methods of excavation and recording introduced at this time were the most advanced in existence prior to the 1960s. After Stalin's "correction" of "Marr's mistakes" in 1949–50, the neglect of classification was blamed on the "the Marrists," which was code for Leningrad intellectuals. Although Marr had invented the term, *veshchevedenie*, "thingizing," to characterize pre-revolutionary archaeology, the odium of "thing worship" and its identification with the very process of classifying objects and other artifacts was a byproduct of the inculcation of "Party spirit" in a climate that absolutized doctrine. It happened that responsibility for creating doctrine in ethnography and archaeology fell mainly on prehistorians and linguists with solid academic credentials earned prior to the Revolution. They were mostly ensconced in the State Academy of the History of Material Culture (GAIMK), headed by Marr until his death in 1934, which became part of the Academy of Sciences in 1932 and an Institute within it around the time of the demise of the Communist Academy in 1936. "By proclaiming Marr not just a Marxist, but a revolutionary thinker, whose 'New Doctrine of Language' was directed against the very foundations of Comparative Linguistics and was accordingly reviled by 'bourgeois linguists,' by attaching this 'Doctrine' to archaeology as the principles for a theory of the 'history of material culture' (a term Marr coined in opposition to the conception of archaeology as an autonomous science), GAIMK, where in 1928 Marxism was not yet a part of archaeology, became in 1929–30 a front of Marxism in archaeology ... Thus, the 'Old Guard' of GAIMK was able, with the borrowed authority of Marr, to retain their pre-eminence in the face of a challenge by the 'upstart' Moscovites" (J. Howe, op. cit., 1980, p. 178). In 1931–32, ethnography was covered by Marr's blanket as well. In this way, "Marrism" temporarily saved these sciences from complete indoctrination. Had doctrinal authority been transferred at this time from these archaeologists, historians and linguists with academic standing (no field ethnography had any) to Old Bolshevik intellectuals and first generation Soviet scientists, archaeology and ethnography probably would have been much worse off, since this would have exposed the leaders to the fate of Bolshevik theoreticians associated with the Society of Marxist Historians. As it was, completion of indoctrination in 1949–51 (see below) resulted mainly in a transfer of authority from Leningrad to Moscow, where the headquarters of the Institutes of Archaeology and of Ethnography were moved. A.V. Artsikhovskii, Moscow archaeologist and one of the principals in the debate with the Leningraders in 1929–32, wrote during the "rectification" (Puti preodoleniîa vliîaniîa N. Îa. Marra v arkheologii, A.D. Udal'tsov (ed.), Protiv vul'garizatsii marksizma v arkheologii, Moskva, Izd. AN, 1953, pp. 54–65):

> Under the influence of the Marrists, many archaeologists shrank from defining, classifying and chronologizing archaeological finds. They feared rebukes for thingizing. The ambiguous term, "thingizing," invented by Marr, covered completely dissimilar phenomena: on the one hand, the bourgeois fetishizing of objects and bourgeois notions of their self-development; on the other, the study of objects undertaken as essential research on the primary sources, without which archaeology ceases to be a science.

89. Karl August Wittfogel was a principal in this controversy, although he had no direct part in the debate. See K. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism: A Study of Total Power* (New Haven: Yale University, 1957), for his interpretation of the "Leningrad discussions" of 1929–31. Not only is Wittfogel an unreliable source on these discussions, which he does not appear to have understood (Wittfogel was not fluent in Russian, and his own views do not seem to have developed to take into account the new evidence and arguments emerging in the course of the discussions), but he distorts the ideas of Marx and Lenin on the "Asiatic Mode of Production." He makes no mention of the views of Bogdanov and Bukharin, which were very influential at this time. The broad spectrum of opinion among Soviet scholars in this period is ignored, perhaps because most of it was in support of the ideas he claims were either forbidden or psychologically unacceptable to Russians trapped within a re-emerging despotism. His own views are naive and simplistic in comparison even to the opponents of the "Asiatic Formation" in these discussions.
90. It should be stressed that, whatever the conclusion, the debate was over real issues. Both proponents and opponents of the "Asiatic Formation" had valid points, and a case can be made that in 1929–31 the opponents often had better arguments. A complicating factor was the connection between these discussions and the critique of Mikhail Pokrovskii's thesis that Russia had experienced a sort of hypertrophied "mercantile capitalism." The opponents of *Aziatshchina* also opposed Mikhail Pokrovskii's version of Russian exceptionalism, and on solid grounds, Concerning Pokrovskii, Konstantin Shteppa wrote that his "personal authority proceeded from the uniting in one individual, as in no other in the Party, of a knowledge of Marxist theory and real scholarly erudition, such as even Lenin had not possessed, to say nothing of Stalin" (op. cit., p. 96). Around Pokrovskii in the Society of Marxist Historians were gathered the "Old Bolsheviks," the original Party cadres raised on theory and steeped in the traditions of revolutionary struggle, who saw in the crisis that began in late 1927 a threat of a "Rightist danger," which they associated with the rise to power of opportunists and technocrats in the alliance between *apparatchiki* and "bourgeois specialists" during NEP. They believed that, by enforcing adherence to doctrine, inculcation of "Party spirit" was the key to salvation. The loss of prestige suffered by Pokrovskii as a result of the rejection of his thesis presaged ill for the Old Bolsheviks. It provided ammunition for an all-out attack on Porkovskii's legacy (he died in 1932) engineered, no doubt, by Stalin and his closest aides, which was a pretext for disbanding the

Society of Marxist Historians and abolishing the Communist Academy, thereby transferring all authority in academic matters to the former Imperial Academy of Sciences, which meant in practice – and still means today, whenever consensus is impossible – to the ruling hierarchy.

91. Ravdonikas was quite explicit about the relationship between the recognition of the emergence of private property in the means of production as an obligatory step in the division of society into classes and the need to codify a progression from matrilineal kingroups to patrilineal succession and inheritance concentrated in extended family household communes: V.I. Ravdonikas, "Marks-Engel's i osnovnye problemy doklassovogo obshchestva. Karl Marks i problemy dokapitalisticheskikh formatsii" (Izvestiia Gosudarstvennoĭ akademii istorii material'noĭ kul'tury, vyp. 90) (Leningrad, 1934) pp. 118–216.
92. The most important of these was the introduction to political economy by the well-known pre-revolutionary philosopher and economist, Alexander Bogdanov, in collaboration with the Marxist theoretician, Ivan Stepanov-Skvortsov (Kurs politicheskoĭ ekonomiki, 2-oe izdanie, Moskva, 1918, Volume I), referred to by Danilova in her PIDO Two paper.

    As late as 1931, the soiologist, P. Kushner (Knyshev), author of the standard "social science" text of the 1920s, wrote (P. Kushner, Vvedenie, A. Bukovskiĭ i O. Trakhtenberg, Ocherk istorii dokapitalisticheskogo obshchestva, Moskva, 1931, p. VI):

    > ... the birth of a concept of private property and its institutionalization occurred long after exploitation of man by man had begun. Private property was preceded by such group forms as kingroup and family property. It is essential to distinguish a right to control or have at one's disposal some means of production from private ownership of it. A concept of property distinct from use-right and control was nonexistent prior to capitalism. But no one would conclude that capitalism is the only form of exploitation ever to exist in history.

    As Ravdonikas observed in the previously cited report (op. cit. 1932, pp. 47, 60), the authors of such ideas were saying in effect that "exploitation of man by man is possible without private property" and that, therefore, class society can arise on the foundation of collective forms of property. Bogdanov, writing before the Revolution, went further and argued that the earliest states had a functional origin in a stratum (*sloi*) of "organizers," who transformed leadership into class domination by taking advantage of their positions. Bukharin agreed that systematic exploitation could be the consequence of creation of a state apparatus to coordinate and direct a network of rural communes; he used the term, "military-bureaucratic latifundia," to describe the collective farms established by Stalin's methods. In various articles written between 1921 and 1923, Lenin warned that in Soviet conditions, the danger of degeneration of the state into an instrument of exploitation dominated by a clique of bureaucrats and "experts" arose not from a revival of capitalism, but from "the isolation and atomization of the peasantry" resulting from the absence of an economic infrastructure of factories and roads enabling peasants to produce for the market: in other words, from "too little capitalism" in the countryside.
93. Cf., discussion in K. Shteppa, op. cit., pp. 28–35.
94. Reviewed in: L.V. Danilova, "Diskussionye problemy teorii dokapitalisticheskikh obshchestv. Problemy istorii dokapitalisticheskikh obshchestv" (Moskva: Nauka, 1968) Book I, pp. 27–66.
95. In the 1960s, several historians sought to eliminate slavery from the normal formation sequence on the grounds, firstly, that it is not a mode of exploitation specific to any formation, but may occur wherever exploitation exists, and, secondly, that since it cannot be sustained except at the expense of nonslave sectors, being by its nature parasitic, the slave mode of exploitation cannot give rise to a self-replicating mode-of-production (e.g., M.Ia. Braĭchevskiĭ, "Proisvodstvennye otnosheniia u vostochnykh slavian v period perekhoda ot pervobytno-obshchinnogo stroia k feodalizmu (soobshchenie)." Problemy vozniknoveniia feodalizma u narodov SSSR (Moskva: Nauka, 1969), pp. 39–52, especially 47–50). This veiwpoint formed part of the consensus defined by Danilova in her report in PIDO Two, with the addition that all precapitalist class societies were developmental variations of a single formation type characterized by domination and subordination based on relations of personal dependency imposed with various measures and degrees of extraeconomic compulsion.
96. Since logically such "transitions" constitute the final phases in evolution of old formations rather than initial phases of new ones, "transition" to which may never b be completed (with respect to the transition from feudalism to capitalism, cogently argued in D.V. Gur'ev, "Stanovlenie obshchestvennogo proizvodstva" (Moskva: Politizdat, 1973), pp. 16–47, especially 39–49), it is implicit in this definition of the relationship between "formations" that "Socialism," doctrinally recognized as transitional to "Communism," is not itself a "formation," but the last phase in evolution ("history") of class society.
97. Ravdonikas (1894–1978) was a Latvian archaeologist educated mainly before the Revolution, who became a central figure in the Leningrad Academy (Institute) of the History of Material Culture. He specialized in the neolithic and the history of primitive society. Ravdonikas wrote the textbook of primitive history in use until 1949. He was the principal victim of Stalin's "correction" of Marr. For analysis of his role and his theoretical contributions, see J. Howe, op. cit., 1980. Among the scientists who worked on developing a theory of human evolution and of the Primitive Communal Formation, which became frozen as the doctrine of the history of primitive society, only two appear to have been field ethnographers by training, the Mordvin, Nikolai Matorin and A.M. Zolotarëv (see below). Although considered an ethnographer, Mark Kosvén

(1885–1967), author of the post-Ravdonikas textbook on primitive history, had no field experience. Pëtr Efimenko (1884–1969), the great Soviet Paleolithic archaeologist of the 1920s to 1950s, who wrote the first and so far, only large-scale summary of the Paleolithic of the USSR (the last edition was in 1953), was the son of two prominent ethnographers of the second half of the last century. While he undertook limited ethnographic field work in the 1920, he had no special training.

98. V.I. Ravdonikas, op. cit., 1932, p. 50.
99. Cf., D. Gur'ev, op. cit., 1973.
100. E.g., (V.P. Alekseev), "Vozniknovenie i evoliûtsiia gominid. Istoriia pervobytnogo obshchestva. Obshchie voprosy. Problemy antropogeneza" (Moskva: Nauka, 1983), pp. 188–227; P.I. Boriskovskiĭ, "Vozniknovenie chelovecheskogo obshchestva." Paleolit mira. Issledovaniia po arkheologii drevnego kammennogo veka" (Leningrad: Nauka), vol. 1, pp. 24–43.
101. Îu.I. Semënov, "Kak vozniklo chelovechestvo" (Moskva: Nauka, 1966), pp. 262–75; same, "Stanovlenie chelovecheskogo obshchestva. Istoriia pervobytnogo obshchestva. Obshchie voprosy. Problemy natropogeneza" (Moskva: Nauka, 1983), pp. 302–26, where he introduces a new term, "herd selection" (*gregarnyi otbor*). The reader may detect a general resemblance of this version of "dialectical leaps" to the "punctuated equilibria" of Stephen Jay Gould and Steven Stanley – see the latter's *Macro-evolution: Pattern and Process* (San Francisco: Freeman, 1979), for an exposition of the theory. The notion that species' replacement is an evolutionary event involving a relatively rapid shift between adaptively stable states was advanced by Shmal'gauzen in the USSR over thirty years ago (Theory of Stabilizing Selection).
102. Îu.I. Semënov, op. cit., 1983, pp. 241.
103. E. Gellner (ed.), op. cit., 1980.
104. Loren Grahem makes this point in his excellent study on Soviet "Dialectical Materialism," op. cit., 1972.
105. Reviewed in J. Howe, op. cit., 1980.
106. Cf., V.R. Kabo, "Pervobytnaia obshchina okhotnikov i sobiratelei (po avstraliĭskim materialam). Problemy istorii dokapitalisticheskikh obshchestv." Book 1 (Moskva: Nauka, 1968), pp. 223–65; V.M. Bakhta, R.V. Senîuta, "Lokal'naia gruppa, sem'ia i uzy rodstva v obshchestve aborigenov Avstralii. Okhotniki-sobirateli-rybolovy" (Leningrad: Nauka, 1972), pp. 68–90; N.B. Ter-Akopian, "O sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh otnosheniiakh v pervobytnom obshchestve." *Sovetskaia Etnografiia*, Vol. 3 (1977), pp. 64–7; same, "K. Marks i F. Engel's o kharaktere pervichnoĭ obshchestvennoĭ formatsii. Problemy istorii dokapitalisticheskikh obshchestv," Book 1 (Moskva: Nauka, 1968), pp. 67–88; Îu.I. Semënov, "O periodizatsii pervobytnoĭ istorii," *Sovetskaia Etnografiia* Vol. 6 (1965), pp. 74–93; same, "Ob iznachal' noĭ forme pervobytnykh sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh otnosheniĭ," *Sovetskaia Etnografiia* Vol. 2 (1977), pp. 15–28; D.V. Gur'ev, "O spetsifike proizvodstvennykh otnosheniĭ pervobytnogo obshchestva (v sviazi s obsuzhdeniem kontseptsii Îu.I. Semënova)," *Sovetskaia Etnografiia* Vol. 1 (1977), pp. 71–84. This represents only a sample.
107. Notably, in F. Engels, "The Part Played by Labor in the Transition From Ape to Man." Appendix to *Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (New York: International, 1972), pp. 251–64. The most complete discussion of Marx's views on the subject in English is probably Gy. Márkus, *Marxism and Anthropology: The Concept of 'Human Essence' in the Philosophy of Marx* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1978).
108. See especially: S.L. Washburn, "Tools and Human Evolution," *Scientific American*, Vol. 203 (1960), pp. 63–73, and many later works by the same author.
109. See especially C.O. Lovejov, "The Origin of Man," *Science*, Vol. 211 (1981), pp. 341–50.
110. We are aware of only two recent attempts: E.E. Ruyle, "Labor, People, Culture: A Labor Theory of Human Origins," *Yearbook of Physical Anthropology*, (20) 1976, pp. 136–63; Ch. Woolfson, *The Labour Theory of Culture: A Re-Examination of Engels' Theory of Human Origins* (London. Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982).
111. Îu.I. Semënov, "Vozniknovenie chelovecheskogo obshchestva" (Krasnoiarsk: Krasnoiarsk. ped. institut, 1962); same, op. cit., 1966; same, "O materinskom rode i osedlosti v pozdnem paleolite," *Sovetskaia Etnografiia*, Vol. 4 (1973), pp. 52–65; same, "Proiskhozhdenie braka i sem'i, Moskva" ("Mysl'", 1974); same, op. cit., 1983. Critiques are numerous, some bordering on denunciation. One senses often the frustration of the critic, who seems to feel that, no matter what he or she says, Semënov's idealist speculations will prevail. In Semënov's defense, it must be said that he engages in debate, resorting mainly to logic and interpretations of evidence rather than appeals to the "classics of Marxism-Leninism." This allows room for controversy. A well-argued theoretical defense of doctrine is preferable, certainly, to a defense that relies on authority. Examples of criticism: V.M. Bakhta, D.V. Gur'ev, I.F. Kuznetsov, Papytka filosovskogo issledovaniia problem antropogeneza." (Voprosy Filosofii, 1964), Vol. 8, pp. 172–77; same, "Eshchë raz o knige Îu.I. Semënova." (Voprosy Filosofii, 1965), Vol. 6, pp. 175–80; "Obzor pisem." (Vorposy Filosofii, 1965), Vol. 6, pp. 180–83; G.P. Grigor'ev, "Nachalo verkhnego paleolita i proiskhozhdenie" *Homo sapiens* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1977), p. 191; V.R. Kabo, op. cit., 1968, pp. 243–44; same, op. cit., 1972, pp. 57, 62–65; M.B. Krîukov, 'Daët li sistema brachnykh klassov kliuch k razgadke "avstraliĭskoĭ kontroverzy"?' *Sovetskaia Etnografiia*, Vol. 3 (1974), pp. 60–70; E.S. Markarian, "O genezise chelovechsekoĭ deîatel'nosti i kul'tury," (Erevan, NA Armianskoi SSR, 1973); D.V. Gur'ev, op. cit., 1973.
112. Îu.I. Semënov, op. cit., 1962, 1965, 1974, 1983.
113. Idem.
114. Refer to note [44]. Soviet ethnographers do not distinguish (matri)lineal from (matri)lateral, which would be the more appropriate term in this case.
115. Îu.I. Semënov, op. cit., 1965, 1974.
116. G.M. Vasilevich, "Nekotorye voprosy plemeni i roda

u Evenkov. Okhotniki-sobirateli-rybolovy. Problemy sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh otnosheniĭ v dozemledel'cheskom obshchestve, (Leningrad: Nauka, 1972), pp. 160–71.

117. The appointment of a young scientist (he was 35), who had little academic standing (he had yet to earn the equivalent of a doctoral degree, and was not a full professor), to such a high position was probably less a reflection of his talents and energy, which, it is true, were outstanding, than of the losses among Leningrad Ethnographers and their institutions caused by the blockade and the earlier exodus of fieldworkers trained in Shternberg's school from ethnography. The assignment of Tolstov to these posts upon discharge from the army, because of severe wounds received in action during the Battle of Moscow, was probably an indication of the slight importance attached to ethnography in those years. Tolstov was one of the few scientists to link the Leningrad and Moscow "schools," thanks to his practicum in GAIMK as well as his universalist approach and fieldwork orientation. He was an important moderating influence during the attacks on the 'Marrists" in 1950–51, refusing to denounce Ravdonikas and Meshchaninov or renounce his own "Marrist errors," notably, the notion of a "primordial linguistic continuum," which he repeated in later works. As a result, he was criticized during the campaign against Marr's influences, even though he was the leading Moscovite.
118. See translations of three articles in the collection edited by Yulian Bromley referred to previously.
119. This issue has been raised by Vladimir Kabo repeatedly in his criticism of Yuri Semënov: vid., V.R. Kabo, "Teoreticheskie problemy rekonstruktsii pervobytnosti. Etnografiia kak istochnik rekonstruktsii istorii pervobytnogo obshchestva" (Moskva: Nauka, 1979), pp. 60–107. A thoughtful analysis of the use of archaeological materials for reconstructions is V.A. Shnirel'man "Arkheologicheskie istochniki. Istoriia pervobytnogo obshchestva," op. cit., 1983, pp. 54–68.
120. E.S. Markarian. "Ocherki teorii kul'tury," (Erevan, AN Armianskoi SSR, 1969); same, op. cit., 1973; the author's abstract of the first of these books, in almost incomprehensible English, was published in the previously cited collection of translations: Yu. Bromley (ed.), op. cit., 1974 (E. Markarjan. "Review of 'Ocherki teorii kul'tury," pp. 169–73.
121. An extended analysis and critique of these arguments will be found in J. Howe, op. cit., 1976.
122. Demonstrated by L.V. Danilova in her PIDO Two paper we have already cited several times.
123. See, for instance, D. Legros, "Chance, Necessity, and Mode of Production: A Marxist Critique of Cultural Evolutionism," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 29 (1977), pp. 26–41.
124. Yu. Petrova-Averkieva, op. cit., 1980.
125. W.H.R. Rivers, *Kinship and Social Organization* (London: Constable, 1914).
126. A.M. Zolotarëv. "K istorii rannikh form gruppovogo braka. Uchenye zapiski Moskovskogo oblastnogo ped. instituta," (Moskva, 1940), vol. 2.
127. D.A. Ol'derogge. "Malaĭskaia sistema rodstva." (Moskva: Rodovoe obshchestvo, 1951) (Trudy Instituta etnografii, n.s. 14), pp. 28–66.
128. L.A. Fainberg. "Vozniknovenie i razvitie rodovogo stroia. Pervobytnoe obshchestvo." Osnovnye problemy razvitiia (Moskva: Nauka, 1975), p. 65.
129. Ibid., p. 62.
130. P.P. Efimenko. "Muster'skaia orda," *Sovetskaia Etnografiia*, Vol. 1–2 (1934), pp. 95–122.
131. V.R. Kabo, op. cit., 1968, pp. 259–65.
132. E. Service, *Primitive Social Organization* (New York: Random House), pp. 47–52, 185–97.
133. G.P. Murdock, *Social Structure* (New York; Macmillan, 1949), p. 187.
134. L. White, *The Evolution of Culture* (New York: McGraw Hill), p. 135. Recently, the evolutionary primacy of matriliny has been revived in the U.S. by a few feminists, who probably have no idea that they have an ally in Soviet fundamentalists: e.g., E. Reed, *Woman's Evolution: From Matriarchal Clan to Patriarchal Family* (New York: Pathfinder). Reed is a leader of the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party. The use of history for ideological purposes can make for strange bedfellows.
135. S.A. Tokarev, "O sistemakh rodstva u avstraliĭtsev," (K voprosu o proiskhozhdenii sem'i). *Etnografiia*, Vol. 1 (1929), pp. 23–53.
136. Tokarev was one of the first to stress the principles of generation and of dual division within each generation as irreducible and not satisfactorily explainable by the theory of the "extension" of kinship from the nuclear family propounded by Radcliffe-Brown. Radcliffe-Brown also initiated the trend of speaking about double descent in Australia. Both he and Murdock discussed Australian kinship in terms of combination and cross-cutting of two types of moieties – patrilineal and matrilineal (e.g., in the Aranda and Kariera cases). But Tokarev demonstrated the lack of matrilineal moieties and argued that patrilineal moieties exist only in a restricted form and are not socially recognized (or terminologically expressed) in Australia.
137. L. Shternberg, "Sem'ia i rod u narodov severo-vostochnoi" Azii (Leningrad, 1933).
138. Rodovoe obshchestvo. Etnograficheskie materialy i issledovaniia (Trudy Instituta etnografii, n.s. 14) (Leningrad, 1951).
139. M.O. Kosven, "Perekhod ot matriarkhata k patriarkhatu. Rodovoe obshchestvo...," p. 93.
140. D.A. Ol'Derogge, op. cit., 1951, p. 30.
141. It was finally eliminated from doctrine by Yuri Semënov (Kak vozniklo chelovechestvo. Moskva: Nauka, 1966), pp. 39–48.
142. D.A. Ol'derogge, op. cit., 1951, p. 30.
143. Incidentally, he was the first serious critic of the diffusionist "Hamitic Theory" (D.A. Ol'derogge, Khamitskaia problema v afrikanistike). *Sovetskaia Etnografiia*, Vol. 3 (1949), pp. 156–70), which was abandoned in Western anthropology after the work of Joseph Greenburg appeared fifteen years later (*The Languages of Africa*, The Hague: Mouton, 1966).

144. N.A. Butinov, "Problema ekzogamii. Rodovoe obshchestvo...," p. 16.
145. S.P. Tolstov, op. cit., 1935.
146. N.A. Butinov, op. cit., 1968, p. 122.
147. Iu.M. Likhtenberg. "Proiskhozhdenie nekotorykh osobennosteĭ klassifikatorskikh sistem rodstva (turanoganovanskogo tipe)." Problemy istorii pervobytnogo obshchestva. Sbornik stateĭ. (Trudy Instituta etnografii, n.s. 54) (Leningrad, 1960a), pp. 196–214.
148. S.A. Tokarev. "Obshchestvennyĭ stroĭ avstraliĭtsev. Narody Avstralii i Okeanii." (Moskva: AN SSSR, 1956), p. 160.
149. A.K. Rommey and E.J. Epling, "A Simplified Model of Kariera Kinship," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 60 (1958), p. 64.
150. A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, "The Social Organization of Australian Tribes, Part III," *Oceania*, Vol. 4 (1931), p. 427.
151. Iu.M. Likhtenberg, "Avstraliĭskie i melaneziĭskie sistemy rodstva (turanoganovanskogo tipa) i zavisimost' ikh ot deleniia obshchestva na gruppy. Problemy istorii pervobytnogo obshchestva. Sbornik stateĭ" (Trudy Instituta etnografii, n.s. 54) (Leningrad, 1960b), p. 240.
152. L. Marshall, "The Kin Terminology of the !Kung Bushmen," *Africa*, Vol. 27 (1957), pp. 1–25.
153. Ph.P. Chock, "Some Problems in Ndembu Kinship," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, Vol. 23 (1967).
154. V.M. Misĭugin, "Ob otnoshenii avstraliĭskikh brachnykh klassov k turanoganovanskoĭ sisteme terminov rodstva. Osnovnye problemy afrikanistiki." (Moskva: 1973).
155. Ibid., p. 77.
156. D.A. Ol'derogge, "Sistema nkita. Vzaimootnosheniia rodov u Nkundu po dannym kontsa XIX – nachala XX v. Problemy istorii pervobytnogo obshchestva. Sbornik stateĭ." (Trudy Instituta etnografii, n.s. 54). (Leningrad; 1960a), p. 193.
157. Yu. Levin, "A Description of Systems of Kinship Terminology," in Yu. Bromley (ed.), *Soviet Ethnology and Anthropology Today* (The Hague: Mouton, 1974), pp. 147–66 (Original published in *Sovetksaia Etnografiia*, Vol. 4 (1970), pp. 18–30.
158. M.V. Krĭukov, "Sistema rodstva kitaĭtsev (evolĭutsiia i zakonomernosti)." (Moskva: Nauka, 1972).
159. We have changed the names of structural types, since the names used by Kriukov (Iroquois, Hawaiian, Arabic, English) are ethnically oriented.
160. G. Dole, "The Development of Patterns of Kinship Nomenclature," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1957.
161. G. Dole, "The Lineage Pattern of Kinship Nomenclature," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, Vol. 21 (1965), p. 50.
162. Ibid., p. 49.
163. Ibid., p. 55.
164. D.A. Ol'derogge, op. cit., 1960a, pp. 24–29.
165. G. Dole, "Generational Kinship Nomenclature as an Adaptation to Endogamy," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, Vol. 25 (1969).
166. He convincingly argued that those ambiguous terms must be retired in favor of Lowie's types, and demonstrated how the morphological structure of the terms was confused with the grouping of kin.
167. Kriukov's book was published three years before Edmund Wilson's "sociobiological synthesis." Therefore, the absence of any mention of sociobiological explanations does not reflect a doctrinal bias.
168. V. Plotkin, "Ritual Coordination and Symbolic Representation in Primitive Society: The Evolution of Kinship," *Dialectical Anthropology*, Vol. 3 (1978), pp. 285–89.
169. N.M. Girenko. "Sistema terminov rodstva i sistema sotsial'nykh kategoriĭ." *Sovetskaia Etnografiia*, Vol. 6 (1974), pp. 48–50.
170. M. Godelier, "System, Structure and Contradiction in Capital," in R. Miliband and J. Saville (eds.), *The Socialist Register* (London: Merlin, 1967), p. 112.
171. A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, "Introduction," in A.R. Radcliffe-Brown and C.D. Ford, (eds.), *African Systems and Kinship and Marriage* (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 23.
172. N.M. Girenko, op. cit., 1974, p. 42.
173. Ibid., p. 49.
174. N.M. Girenko, "K voprosu ob evolĭutsii sistem rodstva u nekotorykh narodov ekvatorial'noĭ i tropicheskoĭ i tropicheskoĭ Afriki," *Africana*, vol. XI (Trudy Instituta etnografii, n.s., 105, 1978), p. 52.
175. S.P. Tolstov, "K istorii drevneturskoĭ sotsial'noi terminologii." (Vestnik Drevneĭ Istorii, vol. 1), pp. 72–81.
176. A.A. Popov, "Tavgiĭtsy. Materialy po etnografii avamskikh i vedeevskikh tavgiĭtsev." (Moskva-Leningrad; AN SSSR, 1936); same. "Nganasany. Vyp. 1. Material'naia kul'tura" (Trudy Instituta etnografii, n.s., 3) (Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1948).
177. K.L. Zadhykhina, "Perezhitki vozrastnykh klassov u narodov Sredneĭ Azii. Rodovoe obshchestvo..." pp. 157–80.
178. V.M. Misĭugin i S.B. Chernetsov. "Khronika galla kak etnoistoricheskiĭ istochnik," *Africana*, vol. XI (Trudy Instituta etnografii, n.s., 105, 1978), pp. 151–92.
179. Ibid., pp. 172–78.
180. Propp, of course, did not emerge in a vacuum. The structural approach developed in the social sciences in Russia in the early twentieth century and produced such important figures as A. Veselovsky in folklore studies, N. Trubetskoy in phonetics, M. Bakhtin in literary criticism, Roman Jacobson and others. The "semiotic" approach, as it is often called in the Soviet Union today, has survived all the ideological upheavals and political ups and downs. It is represented today by the works of V. Ivanov, N. Toporov, and especially by the Tartu school (in Estonia) headed by Yu. Lotman.
181. An interesting work on the strength of pre-Islamic religious tradition in Soviet Central Asia was done by A. Snesarev, "Remnants of pre-Islamic Beliefs and Rituals Among the Khorezm Uzbeks," *Soviet Anthropology and Archaeology*, Vol. 9 (1970), pp. 204–25. Characteristically, however, it is viewed mainly as a "remnant" of the past, and is also used to claim that Islam in Central Asia is not pure and therefore somehow less harmful. The missing point here is the fact that

in Soviet Central Asia the terms "Moslem" or "Islam" are more and more used not in a strictly religious sense, but as a superethnic designation of all nominally Islamicized Central Asians as opposed to the Russians – see the discussion in H.D. D'Encausse, *Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt* (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), pp. 250–64.

182. The very term *etnos*, used in Soviet ethnography today, was borrowed from the book by S.M. Shirokogoroff, "Etnos, Issledovanie osnovnikh printsipov izemeniia etnicheskikh i etnograficheskikh iavlenii" (Shanghai, 1923).
183. For the official Soviet position on the "methodological base" of ethnopsychology, see, I.S. Kon, "Ethnography and Psychology," in E. Gellner (ed.), *Soviet and Western Anthropology* (New York: Columbia, 1980), pp. 217–30. Psychology, and forms of social consciousness are the subject of some interesting work by Soviet historians (see, e.g., M. Gurevich, "Individual and Society in the Barbarian States," *Soviet Anthropology and Archaeology*, vol. XI (1977), original was in PIDO Two, 1968, pp. 384–424.
184. See Iu. Bromley, "Etnos i etnografiia" (Moskva: Nauka, 1973). But this point again is a return to the position of S. Shirokogoroff mentioned above, whom Bromley cites.
185. Yu. Bromley, op. cit., 1974, pp. 20–21.
186. This method of forming consensus without taking a formal vote or having a structured discussion was characteristic of the Russian peasant commune (in the *skhod*, or "coming together") and is still very much the way the decisions are made, from top to bottom of the Soviet hierarchy. The official or public discussion usually is obviously prearranged, which does not make a negative impression on most people, culturally conditioned to see it as normal.

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